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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

The State, Respondent, 
v. 
Matthew S. Medley, Appellant. 
Appellate Case No. 2014-001499 
Appeal From Cherokee County 
G. Edward Welmaker, Circuit Court Judge 
Opinion No. 5412 

Heard April 19, 2016 – Filed June 15, 2016 

AFFIRMED 
Appellate Defender David Alexander, of Columbia, for 
Appellant. 
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant 
Attorney General Susannah R. Cole, both of Columbia; 
and Solicitor Barry Joe Barnette, of Spartanburg, for 
Respondent. 
WILLIAMS, J.:  Matthew S. Medley appeals his conviction for driving under the 
influence (DUI), second offense, arguing the circuit court erred in admitting 
incriminating statements he made while in custody regarding his alcohol
consumption. We affirm. 
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FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On the evening of April 20, 2013, officers with the Cherokee County Sheriff's 
Office were working a traffic checkpoint on Highway 150 North in Cherokee 
County, South Carolina. At approximately 12:45 A.M. on April 21, 2013, officers 
witnessed Medley run a stop sign and speed away from the checkpoint on his 
motorcycle.  Two of the officers, Lieutenant Steven Bright and Lieutenant Brian 
Mullinax, subsequently gave chase in separate vehicles. 
Both officers captured the ensuing high-speed chase on dashboard video cameras 
in their patrol cars. Medley reached a top speed of 109 miles per hour on his 
motorcycle during the chase.  Lt. Mullinax's camera captured Medley running 
through stop signs and crossing over the yellow center line on several occasions.  
At one point during the chase, a can of beer flew back from Medley's motorcycle 
toward the police cars. 
The chase ended at Medley's parents' home.  After Medley stopped his motorcycle 
and ran to the front porch, Lt. Mullinax apprehended him and "put him on the 
ground." Lt. Mullinax asked Medley whether he had a license and how much he 
had been drinking.  Medley responded that he did not have a license and "[t]oo 
much."  Officers subsequently read Medley his Miranda1 rights. Thereafter, 
officers ordered Medley off the ground and brought him to the front of the patrol 
car, where they placed him under arrest and read him his Miranda rights again. 
Officers then searched the saddlebags on Medley's motorcycle and discovered 
approximately eighteen full cans of beer. 
Lt. Mullinax transported Medley to the Cherokee County Detention Center while 
Bright arranged for his motorcycle to be towed.  Medley initiated conversation 
with Lt. Mullinax during the car ride, apologizing and asking to make a phone call.  
Medley also asked if he could drop off keys at his girlfriend's house on the way to 
the detention center. After telling Lt. Mullinax to "take a right" when they 
approached a stop sign, Medley volunteered that he does not drink much anymore.  
Lt. Mullinax asked Medley how much he had to drink that day, and Medley stated 
he "didn't keep count."  Lt. Mullinax told him to estimate, and Medley responded, 
"I couldn't tell you."  When asked if he had more than ten drinks, Medley 
answered, "No, sir." Lt. Mullinax then asked if he had more than five, and Medley 
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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replied, "About four." Lt. Mullinax, however, stated he believed Medley had 
consumed more than that. 
When they reached the detention center, Lt. Mullinax printed Medley's advisement 
of implied consent form, the breath alcohol analysis report with Medley's 
biographical data, and the South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles notice of 
suspension. Medley signed all of the documents.  Following the required twenty-
minute waiting period, all of which was videotaped, Medley refused to submit to a 
breathalyzer test. 
On August 8, 2013, a Cherokee County grand jury indicted Medley for failure to 
stop for a blue light and second-offense DUI.  The case was called for a jury trial 
on June 10, 2014. Prior to trial, Medley objected to the admission of statements he 
made to Lt. Mullinax regarding his alcohol consumption on the night of the arrest, 
and the circuit court held a Jackson2 hearing. At the hearing, both parties informed 
the court that no dispute existed as to what was said and pointed out the portions of 
the videos that were relevant to the motion.  After hearing arguments and 
reviewing the videotapes, the court denied Medley's motion and found his 
statements were admissible.  Medley later raised a contemporaneous objection 
when the State sought to admit the statements at trial. 
At the conclusion of the two-day trial, the jury found Medley guilty of second-
offense DUI and failure to stop for a blue light.  The circuit court sentenced 
Medley to five years' imprisonment, suspended upon the service of twenty-seven 
months, and five years' probation for the DUI charge.  On the failure to stop for a 
blue light charge, the court sentenced Medley to a consecutive term of three years' 
imprisonment, suspended upon the service of three months, and probation.  The 
court also revoked Medley's probation on another charge and sentenced him to a 
consecutive term of one year in prison.  This appeal followed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"In criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only."  State v. 
Jenkins, 412 S.C. 643, 650, 773 S.E.2d 906, 909 (2015).  The decision of whether 
to admit or exclude evidence is within the sound discretion of the circuit court.  
State v. Jackson, 384 S.C. 29, 34, 681 S.E.2d 17, 19 (Ct. App. 2009).  This court 
will not disturb the circuit court's admissibility determinations absent a prejudicial 
2 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
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abuse of discretion. State v. Adkins, 353 S.C. 312, 326, 577 S.E.2d 460, 468 (Ct. 
App. 2003). "An abuse of discretion arises from an error of law or a factual 
conclusion that is without evidentiary support."  State v. Irick, 344 S.C. 460, 464, 
545 S.E.2d 282, 284 (2001). 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
Medley argues the circuit court erred in admitting incriminating statements 
regarding his alcohol consumption.  According to Medley, the court should have 
excluded his answer to the initial question Lt. Mullinax asked him prior to reading 
his Miranda warnings. Medley further contends the court should have excluded 
his answers to Lt. Mullinax's post-Miranda questions pursuant to the rules set forth 
in Missouri v. Seibert3 and State v. Navy.4  Although we agree the circuit court 
abused its discretion in admitting Medley's incriminating statements, we find any 
error in their admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
I. Admissibility of Incriminating Statements 
The purpose of Miranda warnings is to apprise a defendant of the constitutional 
privilege not to incriminate oneself while in the custody of law enforcement.  State 
v. Evans, 354 S.C. 579, 583, 582 S.E.2d 407, 409 (2003).  "A statement obtained 
as a result of custodial interrogation is inadmissible unless the suspect was advised 
of and voluntarily waived his rights."  State v. Miller, 375 S.C. 370, 379, 652 
S.E.2d 444, 449 (Ct. App. 2007). 
In both Seibert and Navy, the courts emphasized that
Miranda's warnings requirement cannot be skirted by 
interrogative tactics that undermine the very purpose of 
Miranda, i.e., unless and until such warnings and waiver 
are given, no evidence obtained as a result of 
interrogation can be used against a defendant at trial. 
State v. White, 410 S.C. 56, 57, 762 S.E.2d 726, 727 (Ct. App. 2014) (emphasis 
omitted). 
3 542 U.S. 600 (2004). 
4 386 S.C. 294, 688 S.E.2d 838 (2010).
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"Miranda warnings are required for official interrogations only when a suspect 'has 
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any 
significant way.'"  State v. Kennedy, 325 S.C. 295, 303, 479 S.E.2d 838, 842 (Ct. 
App. 1996) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444), aff'd as modified, 333 S.C. 426, 
510 S.E.2d 714 (1998). 
The special procedural safeguards outlined in Miranda
are not required if a suspect is simply taken into custody, 
but only if a suspect in custody is subjected to 
interrogation. Interrogation is either express questioning 
or its functional equivalent. It includes words or actions 
on the part of police (other than those normally attendant 
to arrest and custody) that the police should know are 
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. 
Id.
"Whether a suspect is in custody is determined by an examination of the totality of 
the circumstances, such as the location, purpose, and length of interrogation, and 
whether the suspect was free to leave the place of questioning."  Navy, 386 S.C. at 
301, 688 S.E.2d at 841. "The custodial determination is an objective analysis 
based on whether a reasonable person would have concluded that he was in police 
custody." Evans, 354 S.C. at 583, 582 S.E.2d at 410.  On appeal, this court will 
uphold the circuit court's findings as to custody when they are supported by the 
record. Navy, 386 S.C. at 301, 688 S.E.2d at 841. 
Examining the totality of the circumstances, we find the circuit court's custody 
determination is not supported by the record.  Although Medley was in his parents' 
front yard, not the typical scene of an interrogation, Lt. Mullinax had him 
handcuffed and pinned to the ground while asking the question that elicited the 
objectionable response. In our view, a reasonable person would have undoubtedly 
concluded he was in custody because Medley was restrained and, thus, deprived of 
his freedom of action. See Evans, 354 S.C. at 583, 582 S.E.2d at 410 (providing 
"[t]he custodial determination is an objective analysis based on whether a 
reasonable person would have concluded that he was in police custody"); Kennedy, 
325 S.C. at 303, 479 S.E.2d at 842 (stating "Miranda warnings are required for 
official interrogations only when a suspect 'has been taken into custody or 
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way'" (quoting 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444)); Navy, 386 S.C. at 301, 688 S.E.2d at 841 (noting 
17 

  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
                                        
 
 
"whether the suspect was free to leave the place of questioning" is part of the 
totality of the circumstances analysis for purposes of determining custody). 
Further, given that the most important factual question in any DUI case is how 
much alcohol the suspect consumed prior to getting behind the wheel, we find Lt. 
Mullinax should have known his question was reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response from Medley.  See Kennedy, 325 S.C. at 303, 479 S.E.2d at 
842 (stating interrogation "includes words or actions on the part of police (other 
than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know 
are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response").  Therefore, we find his 
question clearly constituted interrogation. See State v. Easler, 327 S.C. 121, 127, 
489 S.E.2d 617, 621 (1997) (concluding police subjected a suspect to interrogation 
when, after determining he had been involved in an accident, police "continued to 
question him as to why he had left the accident and when he had last had a beer" 
because they "knew these questions were likely to elicit incriminating responses").
Based on the foregoing, we find Medley was subject to custodial interrogation at 
the time he made the initial incriminating statement regarding his alcohol
consumption. Because Medley was subject to custodial interrogation at this point 
of the encounter with police, Miranda warnings were required.  See id. ("Miranda
warnings are required for official interrogations only when a suspect 'has been 
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant 
way.'" (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444)).  Accordingly, we hold the circuit court 
erred in failing to suppress Medley's response to the initial question regarding how 
much he had to drink that day.5 See Miller, 375 S.C. at 379, 652 S.E.2d at 449 ("A 
5 We reject the State's contention that Lt. Mullinax's question falls within the 
public safety exception to Miranda because this argument is without merit. See 
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655, 657 (1984) (carving out a public safety 
exception to the Miranda rule and stating "the need for answers to questions in a 
situation posing a threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the 
prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-
incrimination").  Asking Medley how much he had to drink, although perhaps 
relevant to his own health and safety, was simply irrelevant to the public's safety.  
The only purpose for asking such a question was to obtain evidence for his DUI 
case. While Medley led police on a lengthy high-speed chase, he was handcuffed 
and pinned to the ground in his parents' front yard at the relevant time in question 
and, thus, posed no threat to public safety.  Therefore, to the extent the circuit court 
18 

  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                             
statement obtained as a result of custodial interrogation is inadmissible unless the 
suspect was advised of and voluntarily waived his rights.").
Having found the circuit court erred in admitting Medley's initial response, we 
must next determine whether the subsequent statements he made in the patrol car 
on the way to the detention center were taken in violation of Seibert and Navy. 
As our supreme court noted, "[i]n Seibert, the [U.S. Supreme] Court dealt with the 
police practice of questioning a suspect until incriminating information is elicited, 
then administering Miranda warnings. Following the warnings, the suspect is 
again questioned and the incriminating information re-elicited.  The post-warning 
statement is then sought to be admitted."  Navy, 386 S.C. at 302, 688 S.E.2d at 841. 
To determine whether a constitutional violation occurred in this setting, a court 
must analyze the following factors: (1) "the completeness and detail of the question 
and answers in the first round of interrogation," (2) "the timing and setting of the 
first questioning and the second," (3) "the continuity of police personnel," and (4) 
the degree to which the interrogator's questions treated the second round as 
continuous with the first." Id. at 302, 688 S.E.2d at 841–42.
Applying the factors to the instant case, we find no constitutional violation 
occurred in this setting. Regarding the first factor, the question and answers in the 
first round of interrogation were not detailed or complete.  Indeed, Lt. Mullinax 
asked only one objectionable question prior to reading Medley his Miranda
rights—i.e., how much Medley had to drink that day—and Medley offered a two-
word response: "Too much."  Although this was arguably a rather damning 
statement, Lt. Mullinax did not continue questioning Medley regarding his alcohol 
consumption at that point in time.  Lt. Mullinax did not, for example, ask Medley 
how many drinks he consumed or how long he had been drinking that day. 
Turning to the second factor, we find the timing and setting of the first and second 
questionings were vastly different in this case.  The first round, as outlined above, 
was brief and took place in Medley's parents' front yard immediately after he was 
detained for leading officers on a lengthy high-speed chase.  Lt. Mullinax, in the 
heat of the moment, asked the initial question regarding Medley's alcohol 
consumption in conjunction with a standard inquiry as to whether he had a driver's
license. The second round, on the other hand, took place in Lt. Mullinax's patrol 
relied upon the public safety exception in its ruling at the pre-trial hearing, we find 
this was error because the exception is inapplicable to this case. 
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car while he was transporting Medley to the detention center.  Although Medley 
was clearly in custody at this point, he received Miranda warnings twice before 
entering the patrol car. Further, Medley's statements in the patrol car were elicited 
nearly twenty-two minutes after the initial questioning.  Our review of the video 
reveals Medley initiated the conversation with Lt. Mullinax in the patrol car by 
stating he does not drink much anymore. 
We do, however, acknowledge the third Seibert factor goes against upholding the 
admission of Medley's statements because Lt. Mullinax administered both the first 
and second questionings and, thus, the continuity of personnel was present in this 
case. As to the fourth factor, though, we find Lt. Mullinax's questions did not treat 
the second round as continuous with the first.  As noted above, nearly twenty-two 
minutes transpired between Medley's statement during his initial detention and 
those made while he was in the patrol car.  While Medley's alcohol consumption 
was a common subject in both conversations, Lt. Mullinax did not initiate the 
second conversation. Rather, Lt. Mullinax responded to Medley's statement that he 
was not drinking much anymore, and the ensuing post-Miranda conversation led to 
statements regarding Medley's alcohol consumption on the day in question. 
Upon a thorough review of the record, we find Medley's incriminating statements 
were not a direct product of the impermissible tactic of "question first, give 
Miranda rights later" that was expressly forbidden by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Seibert and our supreme court in Navy. Accordingly, the circuit court did not 
abuse its discretion in admitting Medley's post-Miranda statements at trial. 
II. Harmless Error 
Even if the circuit court abused its discretion in admitting Medley's incriminating 
statements at trial, we find any error in their admission was harmless. 
"The failure to suppress evidence for possible Miranda violations is harmless if the 
record contains sufficient evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."  
State v. Lynch, 375 S.C. 628, 636, 654 S.E.2d 292, 296 (Ct. App. 2007).  
"Harmless error rules, even in dealing with constitutional errors, 'serve a very 
useful purpose insofar as they block setting aside convictions for small errors or 
defects that have little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial.'"  
White, 410 S.C. at 59, 762 S.E.2d at 728 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 
18, 22 (1967)).
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Based upon our review of the record, we find the overwhelming evidence of 
Medley's guilt renders any error in the admission of his incriminating statements 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  The videos from the officers' dashboard 
cameras showed Medley recklessly operating his motorcycle.  Indeed, Medley 
drove all over the road during the high-speed chase—crossing the yellow line and 
running through stop signs multiple times—and reached a top speed of 109 miles 
per hour. Both officers on the scene testified that Medley appeared intoxicated 
based upon his slurred speech, glassy eyes, and overall demeanor.  The officers 
further testified that he smelled of alcohol that evening.  Medley also exhibited 
strange behavior, asking to use his cell phone while he was on the ground 
surrounded by officers and asking to drop his keys off at his girlfriend's house on 
the way to the detention center.  The saddlebags on Medley's motorcycle contained 
approximately eighteen unopened beer cans, and another beer can flew off the back
of his motorcycle during the pursuit.  Finally, the videotape of the twenty-minute 
waiting period prior to Medley's refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test shows 
Medley sitting with his head slumped over the entire time. 
Accordingly, notwithstanding the erroneous admission of Medley's statements 
regarding his alcohol consumption, we find the record contained ample evidence 
from which a jury could have concluded Medley was guilty, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, of second-offense DUI.  Thus, to the extent the court erred in admitting such 
statements, we find the error, if any, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  See 
Lynch, 375 S.C. at 636, 654 S.E.2d at 296 ("The failure to suppress evidence for 
possible Miranda violations is harmless if the record contains sufficient evidence 
to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."); White, 410 S.C. at 59, 762 S.E.2d at 
728 (noting our harmless error rules "'block setting aside convictions for small 
errors or defects that have little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of 
the trial'" (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22)).
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing analysis, Medley's conviction for second-offense DUI is
AFFIRMED. 
LOCKEMY, C.J., and MCDONALD, J., concur. 
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GEATHERS, J.:  In this declaratory judgment action, Appellant West Anderson 
Water District (the District) seeks review of the circuit court's order interpreting a 
contract between the District and Respondent City of Anderson, South Carolina 
(the City) that allowed the City to provide water service to a certain site within the 
District's boundaries.  The District argues the individuals serving on the District's
governing board at the time the contract was executed did not have authority to 
bind successor boards. The District also argues the circuit court's interpretation of 
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the disputed contractual provision substantially compromised the District's central, 
primary function, i.e., the provision of water and sewer service.  We affirm. 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Prior to February 2002, Duke Energy Corporation (Duke) owned and operated a 
water system serving wholesale and retail water customers throughout various 
parts of Anderson County. On February 20, 2002, Duke sold the system's retail 
component to the City and its wholesale component to the members of the 
Anderson County Joint Municipal Water System (the Joint System).1  The Joint 
System was created pursuant to the Joint Municipal Water Systems Act,2 S.C. 
Code Ann. §§ 6-25-5 to -170 (2004), which allows two or more municipalities to 
form a joint municipal water system to meet the needs of their service areas or to 
create a finance pool. S.C. Code Ann. § 6-25-30 (2004).3  The Joint System's 
members include the District; the City; the municipalities of Clemson, Pendleton, 
and Williamston; Starr-Iva Water and Sewer District; Sandy Springs Water 
District; Powdersville Water District; Hammond Water District; Homeland Park 
Water District; Broadway Water and Sewerage District; and Big Creek Water and 
Sewerage District. 
On March 21, 2002, the Joint System entered into an agreement to sell water to its 
members (the Water Sale and Purchase Agreement).4  Included in this agreement 
was a provision in which the District consented to the City providing water service 
to a facility owned by Michelin North America, Inc. (Michelin) and at least 
partially located within the District's historical service area.  The agreement also 
included a provision referencing an attached territorial map designating the 
respective new service areas for each party.  The attached territorial map 
designated the property on which the Michelin facility was located as included 
within the City's new service area.   
In 2012, the District learned Michelin was building a second facility on the 
property it occupied.  Subsequently, the District received a letter from the City 
1 Currently named, "Anderson Regional Joint Water System."     

2 In 2007, the legislature changed the name of this Act to the "Joint Authority 

Water and Sewer Systems Act."  2007 Act No. 59, § 1 (effective June 6, 2007).
	
3 This provision was amended in 2007.
	
4 The Water Sale and Purchase Agreement was later amended.  However, the 

parties have not indicated that any amendments are pertinent to the issues in this 

case. 
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stating the City would be providing water service to the second facility and
requesting the District to "cease contact with Michelin regarding water service to 
the site." The District later filed a summons and complaint seeking a declaratory 
judgment that the City may not provide water service to Michelin's second facility 
and an injunction against the City's provision of water service to the second 
facility. The City answered and filed a counterclaim seeking a declaration that it 
was entitled to provide water service to Michelin's second facility pursuant to the 
Water Sale and Purchase Agreement.   
The circuit court conducted a bench trial and subsequently issued an order 
declaring that the Water Sale and Purchase Agreement authorized the City to 
provide water service to Michelin's second facility.  In its order, the circuit court 
concluded the District's enabling legislation authorized the District to bind 
members of future boards to the terms of the Water Sale and Purchase Agreement.  
The circuit court also concluded the District's delegation of power to the City to 
provide water service to the Michelin property did not substantially compromise 
the District's central, primary function.  The circuit court denied the District's 
motion to amend its order pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the South Carolina Rules of 
Civil Procedure. This appeal followed.   
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. 	 Did the circuit court err in finding the Water Sale and Purchase Agreement 
allowed the City to provide water service to the entire Michelin site? 
2. 	 Did the circuit court err in concluding the District's board could bind 
successor boards to the Water Sale and Purchase Agreement? 
3. 	 Did the circuit court err in concluding the District's delegation of its power 
to the City would not substantially compromise the District's primary 
function? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"Declaratory judgments in and of themselves are neither legal nor equitable.  The 
standard of review for a declaratory judgment action is therefore determined by the 
nature of the underlying issue." Kinard v. Richardson, 407 S.C. 247, 256, 754 
S.E.2d 888, 893 (Ct. App. 2014) (citation omitted) (quoting Campbell v. Marion 
Cty. Hosp. Dist., 354 S.C. 274, 279, 580 S.E.2d 163, 165 (Ct. App. 2003)).  "An
action to construe a contract is an action at law reviewable under an 'any evidence' 
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standard." Pruitt v. S.C. Med. Malpractice Liab. Joint Underwriting Ass'n, 343 
S.C. 335, 339, 540 S.E.2d 843, 845 (2001).  "In an action at law, tried, without a 
jury, the appellate court's standard of review extends only to the correction of 
errors of law." Sherlock Holmes Pub, Inc. v. City of Columbia, 389 S.C. 77, 81, 
697 S.E.2d 619, 621 (Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Pope v. Gordon, 369 S.C. 469, 474, 
633 S.E.2d 148, 151 (2006)). 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
I. Construction of the Water Sale and Purchase Agreement 
The District contends the circuit court erred in finding the Water Sale and Purchase 
Agreement allows the City to provide water service to the entire Michelin site.  
The District argues the Water Sale and Purchase Agreement allows the City to 
provide service to only those customers existing when the agreement was executed 
and Michelin's second facility, a new "customer," did not exist when the agreement 
was executed. We disagree. 
"When interpreting a contract, a court must ascertain and give effect to the 
intention of the parties." Laser Supply & Servs., Inc. v. Orchard Park Assocs., 382 
S.C. 326, 334, 676 S.E.2d 139, 143 (Ct. App. 2009).  "To determine the intention 
of the parties, the court 'must first look at the language of the contract . . . .'"  Id.
(quoting C.A.N. Enters. v. S.C. Health & Human Servs. Fin. Comm'n, 296 S.C. 
373, 377, 373 S.E.2d 584, 586 (1988)).   
When the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, the determination of 
the parties' intent is a question of law for the court.  See Hawkins v. Greenwood 
Dev. Corp., 328 S.C. 585, 592, 493 S.E.2d 875, 878 (Ct. App. 1997) ("The 
construction of a clear and unambiguous contract is a question of law for the 
court."). Whether an ambiguity exists in the language of a contract is also a 
question of law. S.C. Dep't of Nat. Res. v. Town of McClellanville, 345 S.C 617, 
623, 550 S.E.2d 299, 302-03 (2001).  "A contract is ambiguous when the terms of 
the contract are reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation."  Id. at 623, 
550 S.E.2d at 302. "Once the court decides the language is ambiguous, evidence 
may be admitted to show the intent of the parties."  Id. at 623, 550 S.E.2d at 303. 
"The determination of the parties' intent is then a question of fact."  Id.
Here, the circuit court concluded the Water Sale and Purchase Agreement was 
ambiguous due to the conflict between the "prefatory clause" in the "Background 
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and Findings" section of the agreement and section 6.02 of the agreement, which 
discusses territorial boundaries.5  The prefatory clause states, 
It is presently intended by the parties hereto that the City 
of Anderson will serve (1) two industries; BASF and 
Owens-Corning, located within the boundaries of Starr-
Iva Water and Sewer District; and (2) the industrial 
facilities of Michelin, which are located within the 
boundaries of West Anderson Water District.  Both Starr-
Iva Water and Sewer District and West Anderson Water 
District consent to the City of Anderson's providing such 
services to these industries. However, such consent is 
strictly limited to the provision of service to these named 
industrial customers and no further provision of service 
by the City of Anderson shall be made to any customer 
located within the boundaries of Starr-Iva Water and 
Sewer District or within West Anderson Water District 
without the written consent of such Purchaser. 
(emphases added).  On the other hand, section 6.02 of the agreement states,  
In order to successfully plan and finance additions to 
each Purchaser's System, and to avoid future disputes, the 
parties have agreed upon a Territorial Map of the 
territories of the parties to this Agreement in order to set 
out the areas each intends to serve.  The Territorial Map 
is attached hereto as Exhibit D. 
These two provisions, considered together, render the contract reasonably 
susceptible to at least two interpretations, e.g., (1) the District's consent was limited 
to the customer named in the prefatory clause, Michelin or (2) the District's
consent covered water service to any customer occupying the Michelin site during 
the contract's thirty-year term.  Therefore, we agree with the circuit court that the 
contract is ambiguous.  See McClellanville, 345 S.C at 623, 550 S.E.2d at 302 ("A 
5 While the circuit court referenced the original Water Sale and Purchase 
Agreement, we reference the "Restated and Amended" version of the agreement.  
There are no material differences between the two versions of the provisions 
discussed here. 
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contract is ambiguous when the terms of the contract are reasonably susceptible to 
more than one interpretation.").  Further, the circuit court properly considered 
extrinsic evidence to determine the parties' intent.  See id. at 623, 550 S.E.2d at 303 
("Once the court decides the language is ambiguous, evidence may be admitted to 
show the intent of the parties.").   
Moreover, the evidence supports the circuit court's conclusion that the parties 
intended to authorize the City to provide water service to the entire Michelin site.  
Steven Wilson, the District's general manager, admitted under cross-examination 
that the orange-coded area on the territorial map attached to the Water Sale and 
Purchase Agreement was intended to show the City's service area and the yellow-
coded area was intended to show the District's service area.6  Wilson also admitted 
that when negotiations for this agreement began, "everybody was concerned about
having a map of their service area so everybody would know where each entity 
was going to serve under" the agreement. 
William McCoy, the Co-Project Manager for the Anderson County Water 
Association (later designated as the Joint System), also testified that the color-
coded territorial map accurately portrayed the service areas each member intended 
to serve at the time they executed the Water Sale and Purchase Agreement.  
McCoy further stated the City's service area included "both the big part that's in 
orange[] and the three parcels that are shown jutting out at the bottom, one of 
which is the Michelin property."  While the fifth draft of the agreement omitted the 
reference to the attached territorial map, this reference was added back into all of 
the remaining drafts at the City's insistence.   
Based on the foregoing, the evidence supports the circuit court's finding that the 
Water Sale and Purchase Agreement allows the City to provide water service to the 
entire Michelin site. Therefore, we affirm the circuit court's construction of this 
agreement.  See Pruitt, 343 S.C. at 339, 540 S.E.2d at 845 ("An action to construe 
a contract is an action at law reviewable under an 'any evidence' standard.").   
6 The legend on the territorial map indicates that the City's territory is actually 
coded as pinkish-orange and the pure orange-coded area is the territory of 
Hammond Water District. 
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II. Binding Successor Boards 
The District maintains the circuit court erred in concluding the District's board 
could bind successor boards to the Water Sale and Purchase Agreement.  We 
disagree. 
In Cunningham v. Anderson County, this court discussed the test for determining 
the validity of long-term governmental contracts:   
If the term of the contract in question extends beyond the 
term of the governing members of the municipality 
entering into the contract, the validity of the contract is 
dependent on the subject matter of the contract.  The 
general rule is that, if the contract involves the exercise 
of the municipal corporation's business or proprietary 
powers, the contract may extend beyond the term of the 
contracting body and is binding on successor bodies if, at 
the time the contract was entered into, it was fair and
reasonable and necessary or advantageous to the 
municipality.  However, if the contract involves the 
legislative functions or governmental powers of the 
municipal corporation, the contract is not binding on 
successor boards or councils. 
402 S.C. 434, 443, 741 S.E.2d 545, 550 (Ct. App. 2013) (emphasis added by 
Cunningham) (quoting Piedmont Pub. Serv. Dist. v. Cowart, 319 S.C. 124, 132, 
459 S.E.2d 876, 880 (Ct. App. 1995) (Cowart I), aff'd, 324 S.C. 239, 478 S.E.2d 
836 (1996) (Cowart II)), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 414 S.C. 298, 
778 S.E.2d 884 (2015). This court also highlighted the additional holding in 
Cowart I that the law governing municipal corporations applies to determining the 
scope of a special purpose district's power to enter into contracts.  Id. at 442, 741 
S.E.2d at 549. The court further held:   
[W]here the contract involved relates to governmental or 
legislative functions of the council, or involves a matter 
of discretion to be exercised by the council[,] unless the 
statute conferring power to contract clearly authorizes 
the council to make a contract extending beyond its own 
term, no power of the council to do so exists, since the 
power conferred upon municipal councils to exercise 
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legislative or governmental functions is conferred to be 
exercised as often as may be found needful or politic, and 
the council presently holding such powers is vested with 
no discretion to circumscribe or limit or diminish their 
efficiency, but must transmit them unimpaired to their 
successors. 
Id. at 443-44, 741 S.E.2d at 550 (emphasis added by Cunningham) (quoting 
Cowart I, 319 S.C. at 132, 459 S.E.2d at 880-81).  In determining whether a local 
governing body is exercising a governmental, versus proprietary, function, "'the 
true test is whether the contract itself deprives a governing body, or its successor, 
of a discretion which public policy demands should be left unimpaired.'" Id. at 
444, 741 S.E.2d at 550 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Cowart I, 319 S.C. at 132-33, 
459 S.E.2d at 881). Further, "South Carolina's courts have repeatedly held that a 
municipality's provision of water service to residents and non-residents is a 
governmental function."  City of Beaufort v. Beaufort-Jasper Cty. Water & Sewer 
Auth., 325 S.C. 174, 179, 480 S.E.2d 728, 731 (1997).  
As noted in Cunningham, there is an exception to the rule that contracts involving 
a governmental function may not bind successor boards "when 'enabling legislation 
clearly authorizes the local governing body to make a contract extending beyond 
its members' own terms.'" Id. at 445, 741 S.E.2d at 551 (emphasis added in 
Cunningham) (quoting Cowart II, 324 S.C. at 241, 478 S.E.2d at 838). 
A. Enabling Legislation
The District's enabling legislation is Act No. 78 of 2001, which is codified at 
sections 33-36-1310 to -1370 of the South Carolina Code (2006).  For a complete 
understanding of the issue, we set forth Section 1 of Act No. 78, which states,  
Act 1030 of 1964 was enacted to take advantage of 
federal funding available through the Farmer's Home 
Administration Act to provide for the growing need for 
utility and other services, especially in rural areas.  Since 
that time, the availability of the funding has diminished, 
and federal and state funding are more often provided 
from additional sources.  The General Assembly finds, 
under certain conditions, that the not-for-profit
corporations organized under Act 1030 of 1964, for the 
purposes of providing water services, should be granted 
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the right to elect to become public bodies politic and 
corporate for reasons including, but not limited to, the 
following: 
(1) the opportunity to receive funding, loans, and grants 
from other sources such as the State Revolving Fund will 
be increased or enhanced;  
(2) the right to participate in a joint municipal water 
system as authorized under Chapter 25, Title 6 of the 
1976 Code will be afforded; and 
(3) the cost of borrowing money for infrastructure 
construction and expansion will be lower and growth 
demands more economically met.  
(emphasis added). Section 2 of this act added sections 33-36-1310 to -1370 to the 
South Carolina Code. Notably, section 33-36-1310(A) states, in pertinent part,  
For the exclusive purpose[] of participating in a joint 
municipal water system as authorized under Chapter 25, 
Title 6, a nonprofit corporation incorporated for the 
purposes of providing water or water and sewer services, 
pursuant to the provisions of this chapter may elect, by 
resolution, to become a public service district, a public 
body politic and corporate. 
(emphasis added).   
Here, the circuit court concluded that Act No. 78 clearly authorized the District to 
enter into the Water Sale and Purchase Agreement by granting public service 
districts the power to "enter into contracts of short or long duration" and to "make 
contracts of all kinds and execute all instruments or documents necessary or 
convenient to carry out the business of the district."  See S.C. Code Ann. § 33-36-
1360(A)(9) & (11) (2006).7  The circuit court also referenced the amendment by 
7 Section 33-36-1360(A) states, in pertinent part, 
The newly converted district has all rights and powers of 
a public body politic and corporate of this State 
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Act No. 78 to the Joint Municipal Water Systems Act, Act No. 82 of 1983, S.C. 
Code Ann. § 6-25-5 to -170 (2004), to allow newly converted public service 
districts to become members of a joint water system.8  Section 1 of the Joint 
Municipal Water Systems Act states,  
The General Assembly of this State finds and determines:  
(a) That the present availability of water and even more 
so in the years to come is very crucial to the welfare and 
needs of the people of the State of South Carolina, and is 
a matter of great public concern; that no longer is the 
impounding, treatment, production, transmission, 
distribution, sale, and service of water peculiar to the 
needs and welfare of a particular municipality, but such 
is of great importance to the people of this State as a 
whole. 
including, without limitations, all the rights and powers 
necessary or convenient to carry out and effectuate its 
purposes including, but not limited to, the following 
rights and powers to . . . (9) enter into contracts of short 
or long duration; [and] . . . (11) make contracts of all
kinds and execute all instruments or documents necessary 
or convenient to carry out the business of the district . . . .
(emphasis added). 
8 See S.C. Code Ann. § 6-25-20(h) (2004) (defining "Member of a joint system" as 
"those municipalities whose governing bodies have agreed (1) to create a joint 
municipal water system to undertake the impounding, acquisition, treatment, 
production, transmission, distribution, service, and sale of water to a municipality 
which is a member of the system and other municipalities, and persons which are 
not members when approved by the governing body of each member or (2) to 
create a joint municipal water system for the purpose of creating a financing pool. 
A joint municipal water system created for the purpose of creating a financing pool 
may have as nonvoting members nonprofit corporations created pursuant to 
Chapter 36 of Title 33; however, a nonprofit corporation which has become a 
public service district pursuant to Article 8 of Chapter 36 of Title 33 is a voting 
member.").   
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(b) That the development of the State and its maintenance 
and growth depends in large measure on the availability 
of adequate and safe water supplies and water sources; 
and that the impounding, production, treatment, 
transmission, distribution, sale, and service of water by 
the municipalities of this State through joint action of 
certain municipalities who choose to do so is of great 
importance to the people of the State and to the areas of 
the State where such facilities are present.  
(c) The creation of joint municipal water systems to 
provide and sell water to its members and to other 
municipalities who are not members, but who sell and 
serve water when approved by the governing body of 
each member; and to provide for the joint planning, 
financing, development, ownership, operation, and the 
issuance of revenue bonds by such joint municipal water 
systems is for a public use and for a public purpose. 
1983 S.C. Acts 138 (emphases added).  
In discussing the Joint Municipal Water Systems Act, the circuit court highlighted 
section 6-25-128, which states that contracts concerning the sale of  
capacity and output from a project may extend for a 
period not exceeding fifty years from the date of the 
contract and may be renewable and extended upon terms 
as the parties may agree for not exceeding an additional 
fifty years; and the execution and effectiveness is not
subject to any authorizations or approvals by the State or 
any agency, commission, or instrumentality or political 
subdivision of them. 
(emphasis added).   
B. Authorization for the Water Sale and Purchase Agreement 
As previously stated, section 33-36-1360(A)(9), part of the District's enabling 
legislation (Act No. 78 of 2001), grants public service districts the power to "enter 
into contracts of short or long duration."  Further, one of the express purposes of 
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Act No. 78, of which section 33-36-1360(A)(9) is a part, is to afford nonprofit 
corporations converting to public service districts the right to participate in a joint 
municipal water system as authorized under the Joint Municipal Water Systems 
Act, of which section 6-25-128 is a part.  Section 6-25-128 allows contracts 
concerning the sale of capacity and output from a project to extend for a period not 
exceeding fifty years from the date of the contract.  We find it necessary and 
reasonable to consider both Act No. 78, specifically section 33-36-1360(A)(9), and 
the Joint Municipal Water Systems Act, specifically section 6-25-128, together in 
determining whether the District's enabling legislation "clearly authorizes the 
[District] to make a contract extending beyond its [board] members' own terms."  
Cunningham, 402 S.C. at 445, 741 S.E.2d at 551.      
When we consider these interrelated legislative acts together, it is clear that 
authorizing a joint water system to enter into a fifty-year contract for the sale of 
capacity requires the same authorization for those public service districts 
participating in the joint system.  Therefore, the circuit court correctly reasoned 
that if a joint water system is authorized by section 6-25-128 to enter into a 
contract for a term extending beyond its board members' own terms, the members 
of the joint water system, such as the District, "must be able to do the same."   
III. Delegation of Power   
The District asserts the circuit court erred in concluding the delegation of power 
given to the City to serve the Michelin site did not substantially compromise the 
District's central, primary function. We disagree.   
In Beaufort, our supreme court examined a contract between the Beaufort-Jasper 
County Water and Sewer Authority (the Authority) and the City of Beaufort, as 
well as a similar contract between the Authority and the Town of Port Royal (the 
Town), for the Authority's sale of water to the City of Beaufort and the Town.  325 
S.C. at 177, 480 S.E.2d at 730. These contracts included a provision prohibiting 
the Authority from selling 
water to be used by persons, private corporations or other 
municipalities . . . in Beaufort County, without the 
consent of Beaufort and the Town of Port 
Royal . . . unless said City and/or Town refuse or neglect 
to render such service to such persons, private 
corporations or other municipalities within a reasonable 
time after the same has been demanded.   
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Id. (emphasis added). Referencing this provision in each contract as the 
"Contested Clauses," the court stated that this right of first refusal for all of 
Beaufort County "hamper[ed] [the] Authority's discretion."  Id. at 182, 480 S.E.2d 
at 732. The court affirmed the circuit court's ruling that the Contested Clauses 
constituted an unlawful delegation of governmental power "both because the 
Contested Clauses bind future governing boards and, more importantly, because 
they give away too much power in themselves."  Id. at 182, 480 S.E.2d at 732-33 
(emphasis added).   
We infer from this language an additional hurdle for the proponent of a long-term
governmental contract—the proponent must show not only that enabling 
legislation clearly authorized the contract to bind successor boards but also that 
any delegation of authority in the contract does not relinquish too much power.  As 
to what constitutes too much power, footnote 4 in the Beaufort opinion is 
instructive: "We do not speak to more minor delegations of power, but simply find 
that where the central, primary function of a special purpose district is 
substantially compromised by a contract, the delegation of power may be invalid or 
unlawful." Id. at 180 n.4, 480 S.E.2d at 732 n.4 (second emphasis added).   
Here, the circuit court distinguished Beaufort from the present case by 
characterizing the scope of the District's consent to the City's provision of water to 
the Michelin site as "circumscribed."  The circuit court correctly noted the 
territorial map attached to the Water Sale and Purchase Agreement demonstrated 
that the Michelin site comprised "only a small part of the District's service area."
Based on this analysis, the circuit court concluded the District's consent was a 
"minor delegation of governmental authority" and did not "'substantially 
compromise' its discretion or ability to function."  Id. at 180 n.4, 480 S.E.2d at 732 
n.4. We agree. 
The City also distinguishes Beaufort from the present case.  The City argues that in 
Beaufort, the supreme court was concerned with the Authority's delegation to the 
City and the Town of the power to decide when the Authority was allowed to 
"provide water to anyone in its own service area."  Id. at 182, 480 S.E.2d at 732. 
The City contends that in the present case, the District's discretion was not 
impaired because the District exercised its power to decide who would provide 
water to the Michelin site for the limited term of the Water Sale and Purchase 
Agreement by consenting to the City's service to the site.  We agree.   
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The District compares the disputed contractual provision in the present case to a 
contract provision invalidated by the circuit court in G. Curtis Martin Investment 
Trust v. Clay, 274 S.C. 608, 266 S.E.2d 82 (1980).  In Clay, our supreme court 
upheld the circuit court's invalidation of a provision granting a private individual 
the right to approve "large uses" of a sewer system that had been previously sold 
by that individual to the North Charleston Sewer District.  Id. at 610-13, 266 
S.E.2d at 83-85. This veto power was to last "until such time as the District 
connect[ed] the system with the District's main line."  Id. at 610, 266 S.E.2d at 84. 
The court stated the district commissioners' "abdication . . . of their statutory and 
constitutional responsibility to act for the public welfare to a private party who 
ha[d] no duty to give the public welfare any deliberation was improper."  Id. at 
612, 266 S.E.2d at 84-85. The court further stated, "The police power of a 
corporate political entity cannot be exercised for private purposes or for the benefit 
of particular individuals or classes."  Id. at 612, 266 S.E.2d at 85.   
The Clay court held the commissioners themselves were required to act on 
applications for connection to their system rather than allowing the private 
individual to do so: 
Act 1768 creating the District, though it does authorize 
discretionary contracting, does not allow the District to 
delegate away those powers and responsibilities which 
give life to it as a body politic.  A municipal corporation 
or other corporate political entity created by state law, to 
which police power has been delegated, may not divest 
itself of such power by contract or otherwise. 
Id. Clay is distinguishable from the present case because here, the District has not 
delegated its decision-making authority to a private person or entity, or even 
another public entity, but rather it has delegated the function of providing water 
and sewer service to the Michelin site to the City for a limited period of time.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the circuit court's conclusion that the District's 
consent did not substantially compromise its discretion or ability to function.   
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CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, the circuit court's order is  
AFFIRMED. 

HUFF and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.   

36 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

In the Matter of the Estate of Marion M. Kay 
Edward D. Sullivan, as Personal Representative of the 
Estate of Marion M. Kay, Appellant-Respondent,
v. 
Martha Brown and Mary Moses, Respondents-
Appellants. 
Appellate Case No. 2013-002319 
Appeal From Laurens County 

Donald B. Hocker, Probate Court Judge
	
Frank R. Addy, Jr., Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 5414 

Heard June 3, 2015 – Filed June 15, 2016 

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and 

REMANDED 

Daryl G. Hawkins, of the Law Office of Daryl G. 
Hawkins, LLC, of Columbia, for Appellant.  
John R. Ferguson, of Cox, Ferguson, & Wham, LLC, of 
Laurens, for Respondents. 
37 

  
 
 
 
 
  
                                        
  
WILLIAMS, J.: In this cross-appeal, Edward D. Sullivan (Appellant), the 
personal representative of Marion Milam Kay's estate (the Estate), contests the 
circuit court's decision to affirm the probate court's order1 reducing Appellant's
compensation as well as denying Appellant's request for reimbursement of certain 
fees and expenses in connection with the settlement of the Estate.  Martha Milam 
Brown and Mary Leona Milam Moses (collectively "Respondents"), Kay's sisters 
and two beneficiaries of the Estate, cross-appeal, arguing the probate court 
improperly (1) awarded Appellant a fee equivalent to 10% of the Estate when 
Appellant acted in bad faith; (2) failed to require Appellant to pay all costs and 
attorney's fees associated with the settling of the Estate; (3) failed to rule on certain 
beneficiaries' prospective entitlement to additional proceeds from the Estate should 
Respondents prevail on appeal; (4) limited Respondents' counsel's request for 
attorney's fees; and (5) granted Appellant equitable relief when Appellant acted 
with unclean hands. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. 
FACTS 
This appeal arises out of Appellant's administration of the Estate of Marion Milam
Kay who passed away on May 3, 2007.  In her last will and testament, Kay 
appointed Appellant to serve as her personal representative (PR).  As PR for the 
Estate, Appellant was charged with the responsibility of distributing Kay's assets, 
and in turn, Kay's will granted Appellant "reasonable compensation for the services 
rendered and reimbursement for reasonable expenses." Pursuant to the terms of 
Kay's will, her assets were distributed as follows: Lisbon Presbyterian Church 
received 25%; the Lisbon Presbyterian Cemetery Fund received 25%; the 
Presbyterian Home of South Carolina received 10%; her two step-grandchildren, 
Bart and Martha Heard, each received 10%; and Respondents each received 10%.  
Kay's will also granted her neighbor, Charles Copeland, an eight-month option to 
purchase a one-half undivided interest in an adjoining 330-acre parcel (the Farm) 
1 Pursuant to section 62-1-308(a) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2014), the 
probate court's order was appealed to the circuit court, which affirmed the probate 
court in a Form 4 Order.  See § 62-1-308(a) ("A person interested in a final order, 
sentence, or decree of a probate court may appeal to the circuit court in the same 
county, subject to the provisions of Section 62-1-303.").  Because Appellant and 
Respondents essentially take issue with the rulings of the probate court, we frame 
their arguments accordingly, acknowledging the procedural posture of this case.   
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at fair market value. The Estate, valued at $513,491, consisted primarily of Kay's 
home (the Home) and the ten acres2 on which the Home was situated, as well as 
the Farm.   
Prior to Appellant submitting a petition for settlement to the probate court, several 
issues arose in the administration of the Estate.  Appellant stated Respondents, who 
owned the other one-half interest in the 330-acre parcel, were "bitterly 
disappointed" upon learning they did not inherit Kay's entire one-half interest in 
the Farm. Respondents claimed Brown was entitled to an additional five acres—as 
promised prior to Kay's death—and Kay did not have the right to devise her 
interest to anyone other than the heirs of W.H. Milam.3  Respondents' claim to a 
portion of the Farm was at odds with the option to purchase afforded to Copeland 
in Kay's will. Further, Appellant discovered that the owners of the Farm granted to 
each other a "right of first refusal" in 1972, which created a potential conflict with 
Copeland's option to purchase the Farm.   
Because Kay bequeathed the Estate to numerous entities with varying interests, 
Appellant stated he had to determine the most equitable means of accommodating 
each beneficiary.  According to Appellant, three of the residual beneficiaries, 
whose interests totaled 70% of the Estate, desired to receive their share of the 
Estate in cash rather than an interest in real estate.  In an effort to sort out the 
competing claims, Appellant hired a surveyor and an appraiser and met several 
times with Copeland about exercising his option to purchase.  
On May 2, 2008, approximately one year after Kay's death, Appellant submitted a 
proposal to Respondents and Copeland, subject to the approval of all the 
beneficiaries and the probate court.  In the proposal, Appellant recommended 
conveying five acres to Brown at no cost, conveying the 46.85 acres that adjoined 
Copeland's land to Copeland at its appraised value, and offering the remainder of 
the Farm to Respondents at the appraised value.  Appellant testified neither Brown 
nor Moses ever responded to this proposal.  After a meeting with all the 
beneficiaries later that summer, Appellant drafted a second proposal and presented 
2 The Home and 6.238 acres are separated from the remaining 3.762 acres (the Lot) 
by a public roadway.
3 Kay, Brown, and Moses were W.H. Milam's daughters.   
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it to Respondents. Appellant stated Respondents again failed to respond or offer a 
counter-proposal, and at that time, Respondents retained counsel.  
After twenty months passed, and without a resolution of the Estate, Appellant filed 
a partition and declaratory judgment action in circuit court on January 1, 2009.  
Appellant stated the purpose of filing this action was to determine the rights of the 
parties—arising out of Copeland's option to purchase, the 1972 right of first 
refusal, and other claims made by Respondents—and to generally clear title to the 
property so the Estate could be settled.  Appellant amended the complaint on 
March 4, 2009, at which time Respondents filed a counterclaim asserting a right to 
five acres. Litigation ensued, and the parties engaged in discovery.  After fifteen 
months, the parties retained a mediator in an attempt to resolve the dispute. 
Just prior to mediation, Appellant reached an agreement with Rowland Milam, a 
relative of Respondents, to purchase the Estate's one-half undivided interest in the 
Farm, the Home, and the Lot.  The Estate was not responsible for any repairs or 
rollback taxes, and the property was sold using a quitclaim deed.  The final 
purchase price was $367,000, approximately 94% of the 2007–2008 appraised 
value. All parties consented to the sale of the property.  Appellant then made the 
final distribution of Kay's personal effects and filed the proposal for distribution 
with the probate court on November 12, 2010.  
Respondents requested a hearing, which took place on February 2, 2011, and 
February 21, 2011. At the hearings, the probate court received testimony and 
evidence from the parties but disallowed the introduction of an affidavit prepared 
by Appellant detailing his administration of the Estate and an affidavit from R. 
David Massey, Esquire, in support of Appellant's request for compensation.  
The court subsequently issued an order, finding Appellant "unnecessarily 
complicated the Estate by insisting on filing a partition action."  The court ruled 
Appellant should not have filed a partition/declaratory judgment action, but rather 
should have deeded out the Estate to the beneficiaries by a deed of distribution 
because it found "no necessity for a sale of the real estate." Further, the probate 
court stated Appellant "unnecessarily complicated the Estate by converting an 
eight-month option to purchase the Estate's one-half interest in its real estate into 
an indefinite right to purchase and by giving the option holder the right to buy only 
a portion of the property contrary to the Will."  
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The probate court then ruled on Appellant's entitlement to fees and commissions, 
finding Appellant's claims for commissions were not adequately documented 
because he "had no method or formula for determining the amount for the four 
draws he gave himself other than by pulling a figure out of the air."  Appellant's 
total draws from the Estate on the date of the hearing amounted to $157,179, or 
18.3% of the Estate's value, which the court found to be far greater than the 
statutory presumption of 5%.  As a result, the court held "the commissions sought 
by [Appellant] [we]re clearly excessive," particularly when Appellant offered no 
alternative for valuing his services.  The court acknowledged Appellant "did an 
excellent job in securing the sales price for the real estate" and had "exemplary 
credentials and good standing in the Bar," but this alone did not automatically 
justify the relief requested. In addition, the probate court found Appellant did not 
act in bad faith.
The probate court approved a prior payment to Appellant's law firm, Collins & 
Lacy, P.C., for $13,499.58 and found the firm was entitled to an additional 
$12,306.80. However, the court questioned the necessity of 204.6 hours of 
paralegal work. The probate court disallowed Appellant's request for attorney's 
fees for Appellant's counsel, noting that—although counsel represented Appellant 
well—it did not believe the Estate should pay these attorney's fees.  Further, the 
probate court denied Appellant's request for costs pertaining to the petition for 
settlement and Appellant's expert witness fees.  The court did, however, award 
attorney's fees to Respondent's counsel in the amount of $19,860, to be paid from
the Estate.
Based on the probate court's findings, it concluded Appellant had a right to retain 
$51,300, or approximately 10% of the Estate's value.  As a result, Appellant was 
required to refund the Estate—within thirty days of the order—all additional 
commissions, totaling $42,475.4  After the probate court denied Appellant's Rule 
59(e), SCRCP, motion to reconsider, Appellant and Respondents appealed to the 
circuit court. Following a hearing on July 19, 2013, the circuit court issued a Form 
4 order in which it affirmed the order of the probate court and required all parties 
to bear the costs of appeal to the circuit court.  Appellant and Respondents then 
appealed to this court. 
4 The probate court held if Appellant completed the winding up of the Estate, then 
he would be entitled to an additional compensation of $2,500 that could be 
deducted from the amount owed to the Estate.
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 STANDARD OF REVIEW 
On appeal from a final order of the probate court, the circuit court must apply the 
same standard of review that an appellate court would apply on appeal.  In re 
Howard, 315 S.C. 356, 361, 434 S.E.2d 254, 257 (1993).  The standard of review 
applicable to cases originating in the probate court depends upon whether the 
underlying cause of action is at law or in equity.  In re Estate of Hyman, 362 S.C. 
20, 25, 606 S.E.2d 205, 207 (Ct. App. 2004) (citation omitted); In re Thames, 344 
S.C. 564, 568, 544 S.E.2d 854, 856 (Ct. App. 2001) (citation omitted).  
On appeal from an action at law, the circuit court and the appellate court may not 
disturb the probate court's findings of fact unless a review of the record discloses 
that no evidence supports them.  Neely v. Thomasson, 365 S.C. 345, 349–50, 618 
S.E.2d 884, 886 (2005). Questions of law may be decided by this court without 
deference to the lower court. Moriarty v. Garden Sanctuary Church of God, 341 
S.C. 320, 327, 534 S.E.2d 672, 675 (2000).  The standard of review for an action at 
law is the same whether the facts are found by a jury or the judge sitting without a 
jury. See Chapman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 263 S.C. 565, 567–68, 211 S.E.2d 876, 877 
(1975) (stating in an action at law, the judge's findings are equivalent to a jury's 
findings for purposes of appellate review).  On the other hand, if the probate 
proceeding is equitable in nature, then the circuit court—on appeal—may make 
factual findings according to its own view of the preponderance of the evidence.  
Howard, 315 S.C. at 361–62, 434 S.E.2d 254, 257–58 (citation omitted).   
The underlying nature of the matter before the probate court was the settlement of 
the Estate; Appellant's entitlement to commissions, expenses, and costs; and each 
party's entitlement to attorney's fees.  On appeal to the circuit court and this court, 
Appellant and Respondents primarily contest the probate court's decisions 
regarding Appellant's commissions and expenses, as well as its ruling on attorney's 
fees. Because the proceeding in this case involved claims for money due, we find 
this is an action at law. See id. at 362, 434 S.E.2d at 258 (finding a claim for 
money owed to a creditor of an estate was triable at law with an attendant right to a 
trial by jury); see also Weatherford v. Price, 340 S.C. 572, 578, 532 S.E.2d 310, 
313 (Ct. App. 2000) (stating a suit to recover attorney's fees is an action at law).   
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LAW/ANALYSIS
I. Appellant's Appeal 
Appellant raises the following issues on appeal, arguing the circuit court erred in 
affirming the probate court because the probate court improperly (1) required 
Appellant to refund a portion of his compensation when Appellant acted 
reasonably, his compensation was substantiated by the evidence, and a refund 
would unjustly enrich certain beneficiaries; (2) unjustly enriched one or more 
beneficiaries by returning Appellant's compensation; (3) denied Appellant his due 
process rights because Respondents did not properly request that the probate court 
review his compensation; (4) denied Appellant's request for fees and expenses in 
connection with the hearing to settle the Estate; (5) improperly awarded 
Respondents' counsel attorney's fees; and (6) denied Appellant's Rule 59(e), 
SCRCP, motion to reconsider. We agree in part.  
A. Appellant's Fee 
Appellant first claims the probate court improperly reduced his compensation for 
administering and settling the Estate because he acted reasonably and his actions 
were substantiated by the evidence.  We disagree. 
Pursuant to section 62-3-719(a) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2014),  
Unless otherwise approved by the court for extraordinary 
services, a personal representative shall receive for his 
care in the execution of his duties a sum from the probate 
estate funds not to exceed five percent of the appraised 
value of the personal property of the probate estate plus 
the sales proceeds of real property of the probate estate 
received on sales directed or authorized by will or by 
proper court order, except upon sales to the personal 
representative as purchaser. 
However, "[t]he provisions of this section do not apply in a case where there is a 
contract providing for the compensation to be paid for such services, or where the 
will otherwise directs, or where the personal representative qualified to act before 
June 28, 1984." S.C. Code Ann. § 62-3-719(c) (Supp. 2014) (emphasis added).  
Item V(3) of Kay's will addressed the PR fee schedule and stated, "For its services 
as personal representative, the individual personal representative shall receive 
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reasonable compensation for the services rendered and reimbursement for 
reasonable expenses." 
In Appellant's petition for settlement to the probate court, he requested $93,775 for 
commissions already paid and $13,447.05 for additional commissions yet to be 
paid. The probate court concluded compensating Appellant for the amounts 
requested would total 21% of the Estate's value, which was far beyond the 
statutorily mandated 5% pursuant to section 62-3-719(a).  Because Appellant failed 
to provide a legitimate basis for his fees, the probate court concluded a reduction of 
$42,475 was warranted, bringing Appellant's commission to 10% of the Estate's
value. 
On appeal, Appellant has included all of the invoices, time sheets, affidavits, and 
correspondence in support of his claim that he is entitled to the compensation he 
requested from the probate court.  Appellant also cites to Item VII of Kay's will to 
support his administrative decisions underpinning his fees.  Item VII authorizes the 
PR 
to exercise all powers in the management of [the]
Estate . . . upon such terms and conditions as to [Kay's] 
personal representative may seem best, and to execute 
and deliver any and all instruments and to do all acts 
which [her] personal representative may deem proper or 
necessary to carry out the purposes of this [] will. 
We recognize that Appellant encountered difficulties in administering certain 
assets of the Estate and made efforts to rectify these interests.5  While we do not 
take issue with Appellant's belief that he acted reasonably and in the best interests 
5 Appellant takes issue with the probate court's finding that he should have issued a 
deed of distribution to the beneficiaries for the real estate in lieu of filing a 
partition/declaratory judgment action and seeking to liquidate the real estate.  
Without ruling on the proper course of action, we are mindful of section 62-3-
907(A) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2014), which states, "If distribution in 
kind is made, the personal representative must execute a deed of distribution with 
respect to real property . . . ." (emphasis added).   
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of the Estate, we also do not believe the probate court's decision to decrease 
Appellant's compensation based on the value of the Estate and the court's view of 
the evidence is without support.  Accordingly, we find the probate court acted 
within its discretion in establishing a reasonable compensation for Appellant's
services as PR and affirm the circuit court's decision to uphold the probate court's 
award of compensation to Appellant in the amount of $51,300.   
B. Unjust Enrichment 
Next, Appellant argues the circuit court's decision to require him to return a portion 
of his compensation unjustly enriches certain beneficiaries who requested cash 
from the Estate and have benefitted from the services of Appellant.  We disagree.  
Appellant states "a majority in interest of the residuary beneficiaries (70%) desired 
that the PR liquidate the real estate so that they could receive a cash distribution 
rather than an undivided interest in real estate.  Accordingly[,] the [p]robate 
[c]ourt's ruling unjustly enriches these beneficiaries."  As discussed in 
Respondents' cross-appeal, we do not believe requiring Appellant to return a 
portion of his fees to the Estate would unjustly enrich these beneficiaries because 
these funds are properly part of the Estate's assets. See Dema v. Tenet Physician 
Servs.–Hilton Head, Inc., 383 S.C. 115, 123, 678 S.E.2d 430, 434 (2009) ("A party 
may be unjustly enriched when it has and retains benefits or money which in 
justice and equity belong to another.").  Therefore, Appellant's theory of restitution 
is inapplicable to the case at hand.  See Ellis v. Smith Grading & Paving, Inc., 294 
S.C. 470, 473, 366 S.E.2d 12, 14–15 (Ct. App. 1988) ("Unjust enrichment is 
usually a prerequisite for enforcement of the doctrine of restitution; if there is no 
basis for unjust enrichment, there is no basis for restitution.").  In addition, we find 
it would be inequitable to punish these beneficiaries under the doctrine of unjust 
enrichment based upon their desire to have cash—which they are rightfully entitled 
to and which Appellant consented to—as opposed to a share in the real estate.  
Consistent with Kay's will, a return of these monies would be divided among these 
beneficiaries in accordance with the distribution scheme provided in her will.  
Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's ruling to affirm the probate court on this 
issue. 
C. Due Process 
Appellant contends the probate court erred in requiring him to return a portion of 
his compensation because Respondents failed to comply with the proper procedure 
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for contesting Appellant's entitlement to his compensation, thereby depriving him
of reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard.  We disagree. 
Section 62-3-721(a) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2014) outlines the proper 
procedure for contesting a PR's compensation:
After notice to all interested persons, on petition of an 
interested person or on appropriate motion if 
administration is under Part 5 [sections 62-3-501 et 
seq.], . . . the reasonableness of the compensation 
determined by the personal representative for his own 
services, may be reviewed by the court.  Any person who 
has received excessive compensation from an estate for 
services rendered may be ordered to make appropriate 
refunds. 
Appellant contends Respondents failed to file a formal petition in violation of 
section 62-3-721. Although our review of the record uncovers no formal petition, 
we conclude the parties were aware of the issues that would be brought before the 
probate court at the petition for settlement, including Respondents' disagreement 
with Appellant's compensation.  See Blanton v. Stathos, 351 S.C. 534, 542, 570 
S.E.2d 565, 569 (Ct. App. 2002) ("Procedural due process mandates that a litigant 
be placed on notice of the issues which the court is to consider." (citation 
omitted)). The following dialogue between the probate court and the parties 
affirms our conclusion on this issue:
Court: Who's the moving party in this [case]? 
Appellant's Counsel: As I understand it, Ms. Moses and 
Ms. Brown have requested the hearing, your Honor. 
. . . . 
Court: Apparently closing documents were sent out and 
as per statutory right, interested parties have the right to 
demand [a] hearing concerning the closing of the Estate.  
And evidently, [Respondents' counsel], that's what you've 
done? 
Respondents' Counsel: Yes, sir.  
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. . . . 

Court: Okay . . . Let me ask you, [Appellant's counsel].
Were all of the beneficiaries under the will noticed of 
today's hearing? 
Appellant's Counsel: Yes they were, your honor. 
. . . . 
Court: [W]hen I've done these hearings when there's been 
a demand, it typically in most cases just makes a little 
more sense, and I think the process goes a little smoother, 
is if the -- because typically, it is a complaint about 
something the PR's done or not done.  So typically it runs 
a little smoother if we start the case off as if you 
[Appellant] are the moving party.  So, if there's not a big 
hang-up with that, that's how I would like to do it. 
Based on the foregoing, we hold any purported defects in notice were waived at the 
hearing when the parties acknowledged the issues before the court and proceeded 
with the hearing. See Strickland v. Consol. Energy Prods. Co., 274 S.C. 554, 555, 
265 S.E.2d 682, 683 (1980) ("A general appearance constitutes a voluntary 
submission to the jurisdiction of the court and waives any defects and irregularities 
in the service of process."); Connell v. Connell, 249 S.C. 162, 166–67, 153 S.E.2d 
396, 398–99 (1967) (stating if a defendant, by his appearance, "asks any relief 
which can only be granted on the hypothesis that the court has jurisdiction of his 
person, then he has made a general appearance . . . and waives any defect in the 
jurisdiction arising either from the want of service on the defendant or from a 
defect therein"). Further, based on the length of the hearing, as well as the exhibits 
and documentation submitted to the probate court, we find Appellant had ample
notice and an opportunity to be heard and, thus, affirm the circuit court's decision 
on this issue. See Blanton, 351 S.C. at 542, 570 S.E.2d at 569 ("Procedural due 
process contemplates notice, a reasonable opportunity to be heard, and a fair 
hearing before a legally constituted impartial tribunal." (citation omitted)). 
47 

  
 
 
 
 
D. Appellant's Counsel's Attorney's Fees and Expenses 
Appellant claims the circuit court erroneously denied his request for his counsel's
attorney's fees, expert witness fees, and certain costs for time and preparation on 
the petition for settlement. We disagree. 
In support of his claim for attorney's fees and expenses, Appellant cites section 62-
3-720 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2014), which states, "If any personal 
representative or person nominated as personal representative defends or 
prosecutes any proceeding in good faith, whether successful or not, he is entitled to 
receive from the estate his necessary expenses and disbursements including 
reasonable attorneys' fees incurred." 
While we agree that section 62-3-720 affords a PR reimbursement for costs and 
attorney's fees in connection with the administration and protection of the Estate, 
we find the probate court properly exercised its discretion as to which fees and 
costs would be borne by the Estate and which would be borne by Appellant.  We 
concur with the probate court's finding that Appellant's counsel's fees primarily 
stemmed from the contest between Appellant and Respondents over the amount of 
his compensation and, thus, were properly assessed against Appellant in his 
individual capacity. Further, we conclude this statute was intended to cover 
attorney's fees and expenses in connection with prosecuting and defending claims 
against the Estate, as opposed to the situation before the probate court.  See S.C. 
Code Ann. § 62-3-715(20) (Supp. 2014) (providing a PR, "acting reasonably for 
the benefit of the interested persons, may properly . . . prosecute or defend claims, 
or proceedings in any jurisdiction for the protection of the estate and of the 
personal representative in the performance of his duties").   
To that end, we find the probate court properly utilized its discretion when it 
approved of attorney's fees already paid to Collins and Lacy in the amount of 
$13,499.58 and approved of an additional $12,306.80 to Collins and Lacy for 
attorney's fees and costs that were incurred as part of Appellant's administration of 
the Estate. We agree with the probate court that those fees and costs were properly 
borne by the Estate and find that award reasonable given the circumstances and the 
overall value of the Estate. We also note that—unlike sections 62-3-715(20) and -
720—section 62-3-721 makes no provision for the payment of a PR's attorney's 
fees or expenses connected with a proceeding to review the PR's compensation.  
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See S.C. Code Ann. § 62-3-721(a) (Supp. 2014) ("After notice to all interested 
persons, . . . the propriety of employment of any person by a personal 
representative including any attorney, auditor, investment advisor, or other 
specialized agent or assistant, the reasonableness of the compensation of any 
person so employed, or the reasonableness of the compensation determined by the 
personal representative for his own services, may be reviewed by the court.  Any 
person who has received excessive compensation from an estate for services 
rendered may be ordered to make appropriate refunds.").   
We also find the probate court properly considered the nature of the testimony and 
the role of other witnesses in choosing which fees to assess against the Estate and 
against Appellant. The probate court denied Appellant's request for expert witness 
fees for an appraiser and consultant, both of whom testified at the hearing.  While 
the probate court required Appellant to pay for the appraiser's and the forestry 
consultant's expert witness fees connected with the hearing, it also required the 
Estate to pay $5,000 for the appraisal of Kay's property and $750 for the forestry 
consultant's work valuing the timber on Kay's property.  We agree the appraisal 
and consultant work were costs directly connected with the valuation of the Estate, 
and as such, were legitimate expenses properly paid out of the Estate's assets.  We 
further concur with the probate court's decision to assess the expert fees against 
Appellant as their work product and valuations were not contested issues at the 
hearing. Based on the foregoing, we uphold the circuit court's decision to affirm
the probate court on this issue.
E. Respondents' Counsel's Attorney's Fees 
Appellant contests the probate court's decision to award Respondents' counsel 
attorney's fees based on the common fund doctrine.  We agree. 
"The common fund doctrine allows a court in its equitable jurisdiction to award 
reasonable attorney's fees to a party who, at his own expense, successfully 
maintains a suit for the creation, recovery, preservation, or increase of a common 
fund or common property." Layman v. State, 376 S.C. 434, 452, 658 S.E.2d 320, 
329 (2008) (citing Johnson v. Williams, 196 S.C. 528, 531, 14 S.E.2d 21, 23 
(1941)). "Attorneys' fees awarded pursuant to the common fund doctrine come
directly out of the common fund created or preserved."  Id. (citation omitted).  The
rationale for awarding attorneys' fees in this manner is based on the principle that 
"one who preserves or protects a common fund works for others as well as for 
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himself, and the others so benefited should bear their just share of the expenses." 
Id. (citation omitted).  
However, the allowance of attorney's fees out of a common fund is subject to abuse 
and is only permitted in exceptional cases when required to promote justice. 
Johnson, 196 S.C. at 532, 14 S.E.2d at 23.  Although the attorney's services might 
have benefitted all parties, fees cannot be awarded when the interests of the parties 
are adverse. Bedford v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank of S.C., 203 S.C. 507, 515, 28 
S.E.2d 405, 407 (1943). Before an attorney may be compensated out of a common 
fund, a contract of employment must exist, whether express or implied in law, 
between the attorney and all parties with an interest in the fund. Johnson, 196 S.C. 
at 532–33, 14 S.E.2d at 23. 
Citing to the common fund doctrine, the probate court awarded Respondents 
attorney's fees and held, "Equity requires that all heirs pay for the work of 
Defendants' attorney[] because his work preserved and protected a common fund[] 
not just for the benefit of Defendants, but for all heirs."  We find the probate court 
improperly applied this doctrine.   
Respondents' decision to hire counsel was based upon their disagreement with the 
division of the Estate and the amount of Appellant's compensation.  Because the 
common fund doctrine requires all interested parties to have the same interests, we 
do not believe the probate court should have required the Estate to pay for 
Respondents' attorney's fees. Several beneficiaries were in favor of selling the real 
estate as opposed to an in-kind distribution.  Specifically, Penelope Arnold, the 
director of the Presbyterian Home of South Carolina's charitable foundation, 
testified "[the Presbyterian Home] do[es] not have the wherewithal financially to 
pay property taxes, to keep the land up, which we would be responsible for doing 
or paying someone to do that.  And so the preference is always to sell real estate 
and receive the proceeds." Arnold further stated that, at a prior meeting with all 
the beneficiaries to resolve issues with the Estate's division, she and Reverend 
Hunter, of Lisbon Presbyterian Church, were not well-received by Respondents 
based on their preferences over the Estate's division.  Lisbon Presbyterian Church 
also preferred to receive its 25% share of the Estate in cash.
In addition, neither of these beneficiaries took issue with Appellant's compensation 
as did Respondents.  Furthermore, while Respondents' counsel's efforts resulted in 
monies being returned to the Estate, which arguably was for the benefit of all the 
beneficiaries, we find there was no "contract of employment, whether express or 
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implied in law, between the attorney and all parties with an interest in the fund."  
Peppertree Resorts, Ltd. v. Cabana Ltd. P'ship, 315 S.C. 36, 41, 431 S.E.2d 598, 
601 (Ct. App. 1993). If all the beneficiaries agreed on the distribution plan and 
took issue with Appellant's compensation, then the common fund doctrine would 
clearly apply. However, based on the foregoing evidence, we conclude 
Respondents—not the Estate—should have borne the cost of Respondents'
representation. As a result, we reverse the circuit court's decision to uphold the 
award of Respondents' counsel's attorney's fees pursuant to the common fund 
doctrine. 
F. Rule 59(e) motion 
Last, Appellant claims the circuit court erred in affirming the probate court's denial 
of Appellant's Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motion. We find this argument to be without 
merit. 
In the circuit court's order, it did not rule on whether the probate court properly 
denied Appellant's post-trial Rule 59(e) motion.  Rather, the circuit court—as the 
court of next review—properly addressed the issues that the parties raised to the 
probate court. As a result, we find Appellant's attempt to raise this as legal error to 
be misplaced and without merit.  See S.C. Code Ann. § 14-8-250 (Supp. 2014) 
(noting "the [c]ourt need not address a point which is manifestly without merit"); 
Rule 220(b)(2), SCACR ("The Court of Appeals need not address a point which is 
manifestly without merit.").
II. Respondents' Cross-Appeal 
Respondents raise the following issues on cross-appeal, claiming the circuit court 
erred in affirming the probate court because the probate court (1) improperly 
awarded Appellant a fee equivalent to 10% of the Estate when Appellant acted in 
bad faith; (2) failed to require Appellant to pay all costs and attorney's fees 
associated with the settling of the Estate; (3) failed to rule on certain beneficiaries' 
prospective entitlement to additional proceeds from the Estate should Respondents 
prevail on appeal; (4) limited Respondents' counsel's request for attorney's fees; 
and (5) granted Appellant equitable relief when Appellant acted with unclean 
hands. We disagree and address each argument in turn. 
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A.  Appellant's Fee & Bad Faith 
Respondents first claim the probate court erred in awarding Appellant a 10% 
commission because Appellant acted in bad faith.  We disagree. 
As stated above, we find the probate court properly considered the requisite factors 
and statutory considerations in its decision to award Appellant a fee equivalent to 
10% of the Estate's value. While we recognize section 62-3-719(a) limits a PR's 
fee to 5% of the Estate, we believe the specific circumstances and competing 
interests that otherwise prolonged the settling of "a fairly basic" estate merited an 
imposition of a higher fee.  Further, we find a 10% fee was "reasonable 
compensation" for Appellant's services as stated in Kay's will.
Although Respondents contend Appellant acted in bad faith in the administration 
of the Estate, we find these allegations to be unsubstantiated and a 
mischaracterization by Respondents regarding Appellant's efforts as PR.  
Respondents claim Appellant acted in "violation of his fiduciary duty," "boost[ed] 
his commission," "bilk[ed] the Estate," "loot[ed] the Estate," and generally 
incurred "shocking charges . . . against the Estate."  Although Appellant likely 
could have settled the Estate in a timelier and less costly manner, Appellant 
presented substantiated evidence that he worked diligently over a course of three 
years to accommodate all interested parties.  Further, as noted by the probate court 
in its order and affirmed by the circuit court on appeal, Appellant has "exemplary
credentials and good standing in the Bar."  Respondents' contentions that Appellant 
acted in bad faith and violated his fiduciary duty to the Estate are not well-founded, 
particularly when Appellant submitted evidence he consulted with legal counsel on 
the proper courses of action in administering the Estate; Appellant attempted to 
meet with all the beneficiaries and create a compromise prior to filing a partition 
action; and Appellant "did an excellent job in securing the sales price for the real 
estate." 
Based on the foregoing, we find Appellant did not improperly exercise his power 
in connection with the Estate and presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate he 
did not breach his duty to the Estate and its beneficiaries.  See S.C. Code 
Ann. § 62-3-703(a) (Supp. 2014) (stating a PR has the "duty to settle and distribute 
the estate . . . as expeditiously and efficiently as is consistent with the best interests 
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of the estate" and the "successors to the estate").  Accordingly, we affirm the 
circuit court's decision to uphold the probate court's findings on this issue.  
B. PR's Court Costs, Attorney's Fees, and Post-Judgment Interest
Next, Respondents contend the probate court erred in failing to require Appellant 
to pay all costs associated with the proceedings before the probate court, including 
attorney's fees, court costs, and post-judgment interest.  We find this argument 
unpreserved for our review.  
Respondents' argument on this alleged ground of error is conclusory, only stating it
would be "grossly unfair for the heirs to pay for the PR's attempts to increase his 
compensation and further obscure his wrongdoing," and "[i]f the PR chooses to 
violate his duties and maximize his own interests at the expense of the Estate by 
filing an appeal, the heirs, who gain nothing by the appeal, should not suffer 
because of that." We find these two sentences are insufficient to assert legal error 
and decline to address Respondents' argument on this ground.  See Bennett v. 
Investors Title Ins. Co., 370 S.C. 578, 599, 635 S.E.2d 649, 660 (Ct. App. 2006) 
(noting when an appellant fails to cite any supporting authority for a position and 
makes conclusory arguments, the appellant abandons the issue on appeal); Rule 
208(b), SCACR (stating that, for appellate review of an issue to occur, the issue 
must be set forth in a statement of issues and argument). 
C. Limitation of Recovery 
Respondents argue the probate court erred in failing to rule on certain beneficiaries'
prospective entitlement to additional proceeds from the Estate should Respondents 
prevail on appeal. We find this issue is not properly before this court.  
Respondents did not raise this issue either to the probate court or to the circuit 
court. Accordingly, we find it is unpreserved for review on appeal.  See Wilder 
Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998) ("It is axiomatic that 
an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to 
and ruled upon by the [circuit court] to be preserved for appellate review." (citation 
omitted)).  Further, Respondents cite no legal authority to support their position, 
instead relying on a brief factual argument, which we find insufficient as a matter
of law. See Mulherin–Howell v. Cobb, 362 S.C. 588, 600, 608 S.E.2d 587, 593–94 
(Ct. App. 2005) (finding party abandoned an issue on appeal by failing to cite any 
supporting authority and making only conclusory arguments). 
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D. Respondents' Attorney's Fees
Next, Respondents claim the probate court improperly limited their attorney's post-
trial request for additional attorney's fees, citing to the common fund doctrine.  
Because we reverse the probate court's award of attorney's fees to Respondents'
counsel, we decline to address this issue. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of 
Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (holding 
appellate courts need not address remaining issues when the resolution of a prior 
issue is dispositive). 
E. Unclean Hands 
Last, Respondents claim the probate court erred in granting Appellant equitable 
relief because Appellant acted with unclean hands.  We find this argument is 
unpreserved for our review. 
Neither the probate court nor the circuit court ruled on whether Appellant acted 
with unclean hands. Respondents' failure to raise this issue to either court 
precludes this court's review on appeal.  See Wilke, 330 S.C. at 76, 497 S.E.2d at 
733 ("It is axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but 
must have been raised to and ruled upon by the [circuit court] to be preserved for 
appellate review." (citation omitted)); Rock Hill Nat'l Bank v. Honeycutt, 289 S.C. 
98, 104, 344 S.E.2d 875, 879 (Ct. App. 1986) (stating because the theory of 
unclean hands was not pled or raised to the trial judge, it could not be raised on 
appeal).
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the circuit court's decision upholding the probate
court's order as to all issues except Respondent's counsel's attorney's fees. Because
the common fund doctrine does not apply under these facts, we REVERSE the  
award of attorney's fees to Respondents' counsel. Based on our conclusion that
Respondents—not the Estate—must pay for Respondent's counsel's attorney's fees, 
we REMAND the issue of each beneficiary's share of the Estate to the probate 
court for a determination consistent with this court's opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and REMANDED. 
HUFF, J., concurs. 
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FEW, A.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part:  I concur with the 
majority in all but one respect—I would reverse the decision to deny Sullivan's
request for attorney's fees and expenses for the petition for settlement.  In my view, 
the probate judge's denial of Sullivan's request for fees and expenses was driven by 
his disagreement with Sullivan's decision to file a partition action and ultimately 
sell the estate's interest in the real estate.  Sullivan had the right to partition the land 
pursuant to Kay's will and the probate code and, thus, it was within his discretion 
to do so. Additionally, as the probate court found in its order and the majority 
explains in Part II. A of its opinion, Sullivan did not act in bad faith during his 
administration of the estate.  
Moreover, the probate code required Sullivan to file a petition for settlement.  See
S.C. Code Ann. § 62-3-1001(a)(3) (Supp. 2015) (requiring a personal 
representative to file "an application for settlement of the estate to consider the 
final accounting or approve an accounting and distribution and adjudicate the final
settlement and distribution of the estate").  Moses and Brown requested the hearing 
on Sullivan's petition for settlement, and at the hearing, Sullivan defended his 
decision to seek a partition and sell the real estate.  Because the probate code 
provides a personal representative who "defends or prosecutes any proceeding in 
good faith" is "entitled to receive from the estate his necessary expenses and 
disbursements including reasonable attorneys' fees incurred," S.C. Code Ann. § 62-
3-720 (Supp. 2015), and Sullivan filed the petition for settlement and appeared at 
the hearing in good faith, I would find he is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees 
and expenses. 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

Timothy McMahan, Appellant/Respondent, 
v. 
S.C. Department of Education-Transportation, Employer, 
and State Accident Fund, Carrier, 
Respondents/Appellants. 
Appellate Case No. 2014-002294 
Appeal From The Workers' Compensation Commission 
Opinion No. 5415 

Heard March 15, 2016 – Filed June 15, 2016 

REVERSED 
Kevin B. Smith, of Hoffman Law Firm, of North 
Charleston, for Appellant/Respondent. 
J. Gabriel Coggiola and George Trask Miars, Jr., both of 
Willson, Jones, Carter, & Baxley, P.A., of Columbia, for 
Respondents/Appellants. 
WILLIAMS, J.:  In this cross-appeal arising from a workers' compensation 
action, the estate of Appellant/Respondent Timothy McMahan (the Estate) appeals
the Appellate Panel of the Workers' Compensation Commission's (the Appellate 
Panel) decision to deny the Estate permanent total disability benefits based upon its 
conclusion that McMahan had not attained maximum medical improvement (MMI) 
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prior to his death.  Respondents/Appellants South Carolina Department of 
Education and the State Accident Fund (collectively "SCDOE") cross-appeal, 
arguing the Appellate Panel erred in omitting a finding that McMahan was barred 
from receiving posthumous permanent disability benefits pursuant to section 42-9-
280 of the South Carolina Code (2015).  In the alternative, SCDOE claims that,
even if the Estate could recover benefits after his death, McMahan's paraplegia
would cause his disability award to abate pursuant to subsection 42-9-10(C) of the 
South Carolina Code (2015). SCDOE also argues the Appellate Panel should have 
included in its order a finding that the award of disability benefits violated 
SCDOE's due process rights. We reverse.   
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On June 15, 2011, McMahan was working for SCDOE as a bus mechanic when a 
bus he was repairing fell on top of him, crushing his spine. McMahan suffered a 
T-12 compression fracture and underwent two back surgeries at the Medical 
University of South Carolina (MUSC) on June 16, 2011, and October 10, 2011.  
Dr. Raymond Turner, a neurosurgeon at MUSC, performed both surgeries.1 
During McMahan's last visit at MUSC, he indicated he would be moving to 
Tennessee and requested a transfer of care and sufficient pain medication to last 
through his transfer.  
McMahan subsequently moved to Tennessee with his wife to care for his elderly 
parents. McMahan's medical records indicated he saw Dr. Patrick Bolt, the 
physician SCDOE authorized to treat McMahan, on April 23, 2012.  McMahan 
again visited Dr. Bolt's practice on May 11, 2012, at which time McMahan was 
evaluated by Dr. Bolt's physician's assistant, who discussed his evaluation and 
physical examination with Dr. Bolt that same day.  
At McMahan's initial visit, Dr. Bolt noted McMahan's chief complaint was low 
back pain, particularly in his left lower extremity.  Dr. Bolt's records indicated 
McMahan "walk[ed] with a markedly pitched forward gait . . . .  He [wa]s only 
1 Specifically, McMahan underwent a T-12 corpectomy and fusion on June 16.  
Due to hardware failure from the initial surgery, Dr. Turner performed a second 
surgery on October 10, at which time McMahan received a T-11, T-12, and L-1 
laminectomy and bilateral foraminotomies—with placements of pedicle screws at 
his T-10 and L-2 vertebrae—and a corrective T-12 corpectomy and fusion from his 
T-10 to L-2 vertebrae. 
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able to straighten to neutral, he [wa]s able to flex to 80% of normal. . . .  His 
quadriceps [we]re 3/10 on the left, hip flexors [we]re 3/10 on the left, otherwise 
full strength in the lower extremities."  In the "discussion/plan" portion of Dr. 
Bolt's notes, he stated the following:  
I have declined to take over [McMahan's] pain 
management as this was a stipulation to my seeing the 
patient[;] [I] was [to see him] only for a surgical opinion.  
I have recommended that the patient be placed in pain 
management in the Knoxville area. . . .  I will see the 
patient back after the imaging studies are obtained.  We 
will see if there is anything that may be recommended 
further from a surgical standpoint. Apparently, the 
patient is already at maximum medical improvement but, 
again, I have no records to confirm this.  There is no 
change in restrictions at this time. 
Dr. Bolt performed X-rays during the initial visit and ordered an updated MRI, a 
CT scan, and a duplex scan on that date.  After a review of those scans and 
McMahan's return visit on May 11, 2012, Dr. Bolt noted McMahan's symptoms
were "exactly the same" as those from his prior visit.  Dr. Bolt did not observe any 
new neural pinches on the MRI but ordered an EMG to rule out any 
radiculopathies. 
McMahan died from an unrelated heart condition on October 6, 2012.  On 
February 27, 2013, Dr. Bolt, as the authorized treating physician, completed a 
Form 14B for the Workers' Compensation Commission, indicating the date of 
McMahan's MMI was April 23, 2012.  In addition, Dr. Bolt explained his 
conclusion regarding McMahan's impairment, stating "he had thought [McMahan] 
was previously at [MMI], [but] apparently that was not the case." According to Dr. 
Bolt, McMahan was at MMI when he saw McMahan on April 23, 2012.  Dr. Bolt
believed McMahan was totally disabled given his limited ability to walk and his 
need for a wheelchair.  Based upon McMahan's spinal cord injury and a review of 
the American Medical Association (AMA) guidelines, Dr. Bolt concluded 
McMahan sustained a 54% impairment to his whole person.  
The Estate subsequently filed a Form 50 on May 23, 2013, alleging McMahan 
sustained injuries to his head, brain, back, internal organs, teeth, legs, mouth, and 
ribs in the course and scope of his employment.  SCDOE filed a Form 51 on June 
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13, 2013, admitting injury to McMahan's back and denying all other claims.  The 
single commissioner held a hearing on August 15, 2013, and found McMahan 
reached MMI prior to his death. Further, the single commissioner concluded the 
Estate was entitled to total disability benefits under section 42-9-30(21) of the 
South Carolina Code (2015) based upon a 50% or greater loss of use to McMahan's 
back. Because McMahan was entitled to compensation pursuant to section 42-9-
30, the single commissioner concluded the claim did not abate under the statute 
and, therefore, the Estate was entitled to the unpaid balance of McMahan's 
permanent and total disability benefits as prescribed by section 42-9-280.
SCDOE timely appealed to the Appellate Panel, and a review hearing was held on 
July 22, 2014. By order dated September 30, 2014, the Appellate Panel reversed 
the single commissioner's decision, finding McMahan was not at MMI prior to his 
death and, therefore, he was not entitled to permanent total disability benefits.  
This cross-appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Administrative Procedures Act (APA) establishes the standard for judicial 
review of workers' compensation decisions.  Pierre v. Seaside Farms, Inc., 386 
S.C. 534, 540, 689 S.E.2d 615, 618 (2010).  Under the APA, this court can reverse 
or modify the decision of the Appellate Panel when the substantial rights of the 
appellant have been prejudiced because the decision is affected by an error of law 
or is clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence 
considering the record as a whole.  Transp. Ins. Co. & Flagstar Corp. v. S.C. 
Second Injury Fund, 389 S.C. 422, 427, 699 S.E.2d 687, 689–90 (2010).
LAW/ANALYSIS
I. The Estate's Appeal 
The Estate appeals the Appellate Panel's decision to reverse the award of 
permanent total disability benefits in its favor, arguing the only medical evidence 
in the record established McMahan attained MMI prior to his death.  We agree. 
Section 42-9-280 addresses situations like the instant case in which an injured 
claimant later dies from a cause unrelated to the workplace injury.  Specifically, 
section 42-9-280 provides the following: 
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When an employee receives or is entitled to 
compensation under this title for an injury covered by the 
second paragraph of [s]ection 42-9-10[2] or 42-9-30 and 
dies from any other cause than the injury for which he 
was entitled to compensation, payment of the unpaid 
balance of compensation shall be made to his next of kin 
dependent upon him for support, in lieu of the 
compensation the employee would have been entitled to 
had he lived. But if the death is due to a cause that is 
compensable under this title and the dependents of such 
employee are awarded compensation therefor, all right to 
unpaid compensation provided by this section shall cease 
and determine. 
Because McMahan sustained an admitted injury to his back, for the Estate to be 
entitled to compensation pursuant to section 42-9-280, his injury must be covered 
under section 42-9-30. 
Subsection 42-9-30(21) states, in relevant part,  
The compensation for partial loss of use of the back shall 
be such proportions of the periods of payment herein 
provided for total loss as such partial loss bears to total 
loss, except that in cases where there is fifty percent or 
more loss of use of the back the injured employee shall 
be presumed to have suffered total and permanent 
disability and compensated under [s]ection 42-9-10(B). 
The presumption set forth in this item is rebuttable . . . . 
As an initial matter, we disagree that the dispositive question for purposes of the 
Estate's entitlement to compensation under section 42-9-280 is whether McMahan 
was at MMI prior to his death.  Although the parties, the single commissioner, and 
the Appellate Panel focus on MMI as the lynchpin in the Estate's ability to recover 
2 Subsection 42-9-10(B) of the South Carolina Code (2015) states that "[t]he loss 
of both hands, arms, shoulders, feet, legs, hips, or vision in both eyes, or any two 
thereof, constitutes total and permanent disability to be compensated according to 
the provisions of this section."  Because McMahan's injury was to his back, this 
subsection is inapplicable.  
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benefits pursuant to section 42-9-280, we find this focus is misplaced.  Based upon 
our review of case law and a plain reading of the applicable statutes, so long as 
McMahan sustained an injury covered by the second paragraph of section 42-9-10 
or 42-9-30 and died from a cause unrelated to the injury, the Estate is entitled to 
recover the unpaid balance of McMahan's compensation.  See § 42-9-280 (stating 
"[w]hen an employee receives or is entitled to compensation under this title for an 
injury covered by the second paragraph of [s]ection 42-9-10 or 42-9-30 and dies 
from any other cause than the injury for which he was entitled to compensation, 
payment of the unpaid balance of compensation shall be made to his next of kin 
dependent upon him for support").   
Our conclusion is buttressed by Dodge v. Bruccoli, Clark, Layman, Inc., in which 
we stated that MMI and disability are not always inextricably intertwined.  334 
S.C. 574, 581, 514 S.E.2d 593, 596 (Ct. App. 1999) ("'Maximum medical
improvement' is a distinctly different concept from 'disability.'").  Although a 
finding of MMI often coincides with an award of permanent disability benefits, see 
Smith v. S.C. Dep't of Mental Health, 335 S.C. 396, 399, 517 S.E.2d 694, 695–96 
(1999) (holding it was appropriate to terminate temporary benefits in favor of 
permanent benefits upon a finding of MMI), an individual can also be permanently 
disabled and still have yet to achieve MMI.3  Even if McMahan had not attained 
3 We find the Appellate Panel misstated the law in its final order when it found 
"[i]t is well settled in South Carolina that the award of disability benefits is 
premature prior to the claimant reaching MMI."  The Appellate Panel supported 
this statement by citing to Smith and stating our supreme court "not[ed] that the 
degree of permanent disability cannot be determined prior to MMI."  The issue in 
Smith, however, was whether an employer could cease payment of temporary 
benefits if an employee had achieved MMI.  335 S.C. at 398, 517 S.E.2d at 695.  
Although our supreme court concluded it was appropriate to terminate temporary 
benefits in favor of permanent benefits upon a finding of MMI, the court never 
held an individual was precluded from a permanent disability award without a 
finding of MMI.  Id. at 399–400, 517 S.E.2d at 695–96.  We believe the correct 
interpretation of the law was aptly stated in Bass v. Kenco Group, wherein this 
court held as follows: 
A declaration of [MMI] is irrelevant to the award of 
permanent partial disability in this case.  "[MMI]" is a 
distinctly different concept from "disability." . . .  It is 
true that when a claimant receiving temporary benefits 
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MMI by the time of his death, we hold he could still be permanently and totally 
disabled for purposes of sections 42-9-30 and 42-9-280.
To that end, the only medical evidence in the record regarding the extent of 
McMahan's injury and ensuing disability is that of SCDOE's authorized treating 
physician, Dr. Bolt. After Dr. Bolt examined McMahan, ordered X-rays, an MRI, 
a CT scan, a duplex scan, and an EMG, and reviewed all of these scans—with the 
exception of the EMG, which was not administered before McMahan passed 
away—he concluded McMahan was totally disabled and assigned a 54% 
impairment rating to his whole person pursuant to the AMA guidelines.  
Considering the severity of McMahan's accident, his two back surgeries, and his 
general prognosis, we agree with Dr. Bolt's conclusion that McMahan was totally 
and permanently disabled.  Further, Dr. Bolt was the treating physician approved 
by SCDOE, and if SCDOE was dissatisfied with Dr. Bolt's assessment and 
evaluation, then it should have ensured Dr. Bolt had all the relevant medical 
records it now claims precluded him from making an accurate diagnosis prior to 
transferring McMahan's care from Dr. Turner to Dr. Bolt.  Because we find Dr. 
Bolt properly concluded McMahan had sustained a 54% impairment to his whole 
person, we likewise agree with the single commissioner's finding that McMahan 
was permanently and totally disabled pursuant to section 42-9-30(21).4  As a result, 
reaches [MMI] and is still disabled, temporary benefits 
are terminated and the claimant is awarded permanent 
benefits. . . . It does not follow, however, that a claimant 
who has not reached [MMI] is precluded from an award 
of permanent benefits. 
366 S.C. 450, 466–67, 622 S.E.2d 577, 585–86 (Ct. App. 2005) (internal citations 
omitted).   
4 We are aware that a 54% impairment rating to the whole person does not 
necessarily equate to a 54% loss of use to the back under section 42-9-30. See 
Sanders v. MeadWestvaco Corp., 371 S.C. 284, 292, 638 S.E.2d 66, 70 (Ct. App. 
2006) (acknowledging that the commission is not bound by the opinion of medical 
experts and "may find a degree of disability different from that suggested by expert 
testimony").  However, because Dr. Bolt also concluded McMahan was totally 
disabled, and no medical evidence was submitted to the contrary, we find this is 
substantial evidence of McMahan's condition and support for the single 
commissioner's finding on this issue.   
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we find the Appellate Panel erred in denying the Estate's claim for compensation 
pursuant to section 42-9-280.
Furthermore, even if the Estate's entitlement to McMahan's benefits hinged on 
MMI, we nevertheless hold the Appellate Panel committed legal error in reversing 
the single commissioner and denying the Estate's claim for compensation.  The 
only medical evidence in the record regarding MMI came from Dr. Bolt, and he 
stated on two separate occasions that he believed McMahan was at MMI.  
Although Dr. Bolt did not possess all of McMahan's medical records when he 
initially stated he was of the impression McMahan was at MMI, we find his 
evaluations and diagnostic testing were thorough and his conclusions were well-
founded. We also disagree with SCDOE's argument that a recommendation for 
further pain management necessarily negated Dr. Bolt's MMI statement.  See 
Dodge, 334 S.C. at 581, 514 S.E.2d at 596 (stating the fact a claimant has reached 
MMI does not preclude a finding the claimant still may require additional medical 
care or treatment); Scruggs v. Tuscarora Yarns, Inc., 294 S.C. 47, 50, 362 S.E.2d 
319, 321 (Ct. App. 1987) (holding substantial evidence supported a finding of 
MMI despite the claimant continuing to receive physical therapy).  Rather, due to 
the nature and severity of McMahan's back injury, we find it very likely that 
McMahan would continue to need pain management for the remainder of his life, 
irrespective of an MMI diagnosis.  Accordingly, we reverse the Appellate Panel's 
order and find permanent total disability benefits were warranted pursuant to 
section 42-9-280. 
II. SCDOE's Cross-Appeal 
SCDOE cross-appeals, arguing the Appellate Panel improperly omitted a finding 
that McMahan was barred from receiving posthumous permanent disability 
benefits because section 42-9-280 prohibits such an award after a claimant has 
died. Further, SCDOE claims a posthumous award of permanent disability would 
violate its right to due process because SCDOE was precluded from introducing 
evidence and cross-examining witnesses.  Alternatively, SCDOE contends if this 
court finds a posthumous award is appropriate pursuant to section 42-9-280, then 
McMahan's award would abate because he was a paraplegic as defined by 
subsection 42-9-10(C). We address each argument in turn.     
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A. Posthumous Permanent Disability Determination 

SCDOE first claims section 42-9-280 does not provide for a posthumous 
adjudication of a claimant's permanent disability.  We disagree. 
Section 42-9-280 plainly affords dependent survivors all benefits due to an injured 
claimant who suffered a physical loss when the claimant later dies from a cause 
unrelated to the workplace injury. See § 42-9-280; see also Stone v. Roadway 
Express, 367 S.C. 575, 578, 627 S.E.2d 695, 696 (2006) (finding section 42-9-280 
clearly affords dependent survivors all benefits due to an injured worker who 
suffers a physical loss under sections 42-9-10 or 42-9-30 when the worker dies 
from an unrelated cause).  Although SCDOE argues a prior award of disability 
benefits is necessary for section 42-9-280 to apply, the plain language of the statute 
states otherwise. Specifically, section 42-9-280 provides, in part, the following: 
When an employee receives or is entitled to
compensation under this title for an injury covered by the 
second paragraph of [s]ection 42-9-10 or 42-9-30 and 
dies from any other cause than the injury for which he 
was entitled to compensation, payment of the unpaid 
balance of compensation shall be made to his next of kin 
dependent upon him for support, in lieu of the 
compensation the employee would have been entitled to 
had he lived. 
(emphasis added). In the instant case, as stated in Part I, supra, McMahan was
entitled to compensation for his work-related injury pursuant to section 42-9-
30(21). Further, SCDOE accepted McMahan's claim and admitted he suffered a 
work-related injury to his back prior to his death.  We find it would be absurd to 
preclude McMahan's widow from receiving compensation to which she is 
otherwise entitled solely because McMahan happened to die before the parties 
adjudicated McMahan's workers' compensation claim with finality.  In our view, 
this is why the General Assembly specifically chose the language "receives or is 
entitled to compensation" when it drafted this statute, and we hold any different 
conclusion would run afoul of legislative intent.  See Browning v. Hartvigsen, 307 
S.C. 122, 125, 414 S.E.2d 115, 117 (1992) ("A statute as a whole must receive a 
practical, reasonable, and fair interpretation consonant with the purpose, design, 
and policy of the lawmakers."); see also Peay v. U.S. Silica Co., 313 S.C. 91, 94, 
437 S.E.2d 64, 65 (1993) ("[W]orkers' compensation statutes are construed 
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liberally in favor of coverage.  It follows that any exception to workers' 
compensation coverage must be narrowly construed." (internal citation omitted)). 
B. Due Process 
In the alternative, SCDOE contends that, even if the Appellate Panel properly 
adjudicated McMahan's claim after his death, a posthumous award violated 
SCDOE's due process rights to conduct full discovery, to present and cross-
examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence.  We disagree. 
The South Carolina Constitution provides that, in proceedings before 
administrative agencies, "[n]o person shall be finally bound by a judicial or quasi-
judicial decision of an administrative agency affecting private rights except on due 
notice and an opportunity to be heard."  S.C. Const. art. I, § 22.  Our supreme court 
has explained as follows: 
Procedural due process requirements are not technical; no 
particular form of procedure is necessary.  The United 
States Supreme Court has held, however, that at a 
minimum certain elements must be present.  These 
include (1) adequate notice; (2) adequate opportunity for 
a hearing; (3) the right to introduce evidence; and (4) the 
right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. 
In re Vora, 354 S.C. 590, 595, 582 S.E.2d 413, 416 (2003) (internal citation 
omitted). 
After reviewing the record, we find SCDOE never deposed or examined the 
witnesses who would have knowledge of McMahan's condition and treatment.  The 
only witness SCDOE was unable to depose or require to testify prior to the hearing 
before the single commissioner was McMahan.  Even if McMahan was living 
when the parties litigated his entitlement to benefits, McMahan's testimony would 
not be dispositive on the contested medical issues presented to the single 
commissioner.  To the extent McMahan's untimely death prevented SCDOE from 
deposing him regarding issues like his work history, education, and transferable 
skills, we note that McMahan's widow testified at the hearing before the single 
commissioner on these topics.  Despite her presence and testimony before the 
single commissioner, SCDOE chose not to cross-examine her.  
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Furthermore, SCDOE never scheduled Dr. Turner's deposition nor requested that 
he testify before the single commissioner, despite Dr. Turner performing 
McMahan's back surgeries and providing post-operative treatment at MUSC.  
SCDOE now claims on appeal that Dr. Turner's silence in his medical notes 
regarding MMI meant McMahan had not attained MMI when Dr. Turner 
transferred McMahan to Dr. Bolt's care.  We find this argument unpersuasive. The 
only doctor who evaluated McMahan prior to his death, requested and reviewed 
certain testing, and submitted medical opinions regarding MMI, disability, and 
impairment was Dr. Bolt.  Despite Dr. Bolt's involvement in McMahan's treatment 
immediately preceding McMahan's death, SCDOE chose not to proceed with his 
deposition even after noticing it for August 21, 2013.  Had SCDOE taken Dr. 
Bolt's deposition, we believe some of the evidentiary issues of which it now 
complains could have been addressed.    
In sum, we find SCDOE had the opportunity to present evidence and to examine 
and cross-examine the necessary witnesses but chose not to prior to the hearing 
before the single commissioner.  As a result, we decline to find a posthumous 
award of benefits pursuant to section 42-9-280 violated SCDOE's due process 
rights. To the contrary, we believe the posthumous award of benefits satisfied 
procedural due process requirements. See In re Vora, 354 S.C. at 595, 582 S.E.2d 
at 416 (stating "[p]rocedural due process requirements are not technical" and "no 
particular form of procedure is necessary"). 
C. Paraplegia and Abatement 
Last, SCDOE contends that, even if the Appellate Panel was permitted to 
adjudicate McMahan's entitlement to benefits after his death, the award would 
abate pursuant to subsection 42-9-10(C) as a result of McMahan's paraplegia.  We 
disagree. 
Subsection 42-9-10(C) states that "any person determined to be totally and 
permanently disabled who as a result of a compensable injury is a paraplegic, a 
quadriplegic, or who has suffered physical brain damage . . . shall receive the 
benefits for life." Section 42-9-280 does not include awards made according to 
subsection 42-9-10(C) among those that survive a claimant's death from an 
unrelated cause. See § 42-9-280 (stating "[w]hen an employee receives or is 
entitled to compensation under this title for an injury covered by the second 
paragraph of [s]ection 42-9-10 or 42-9-30 and dies from any other cause than the 
injury for which he was entitled to compensation, payment of the unpaid balance 
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of compensation shall be made to his next of kin dependent upon him for support" 
(emphasis added)). 
SCDOE claims McMahan clearly suffered from paraplegia as a result of his 
accident. SCDOE highlights the emergency room doctor's discharge notes the day 
after McMahan's accident, in which the doctor stated, "[McMahan] was found to 
be paraplegic. CT scan obtained showed of T12 compression fracture with 
retropulsion."  In response, the Estate argues this statement was not a diagnosis and 
paraplegia was not mentioned in the section of the discharge notes entitled 
"Diagnosis" and "Secondary Diagnosis."  We agree with the Estate that this single 
statement is not dispositive on the issue of McMahan's paraplegia. 
In addition, neither Dr. Turner nor Dr. Bolt diagnosed McMahan with paraplegia.  
Instead, the Estate references Dr. Turner's medical notes after McMahan's surgery 
in which Dr. Turned noted, "Patient is mobilizing well with a walker, given the 
initial spinal cord injury." Dr. Bolt's notes acknowledged McMahan's prior back 
surgery and his usage of a wheelchair.  Dr. Bolt's records also indicated McMahan 
"walk[ed] with a markedly pitched forward gait . . . .  He [wa]s only able to 
straighten to neutral, he [wa]s able to flex to 80% of normal. . . .  His quadriceps 
[we]re 3/10 on the left, hip flexors [we]re 3/10 on the left, otherwise full strength 
in the lower extremities."  
SCDOE urges this court to consider the case of Reed-Richards v. Clemson 
University, in which this court upheld a lifetime benefits award and found the term
paraplegic included a diagnosis of incomplete paraplegia.  371 S.C. 304, 309, 638 
S.E.2d 77, 80 (Ct. App. 2006). SCDOE argues the claimant's physical limitations 
in Reed-Richards are almost identical to McMahan's, noting Reed-Richards' need 
for a walker and her incontinence issues after her accident.  See id., 638 S.E.2d at 
78. We agree with SCDOE that Reed-Richards and McMahan suffered from
several of the same problems after their accidents.  However, unlike the claimant in 
Reed-Richards, McMahan was never diagnosed by either of his treating physicians 
with incomplete or total paraplegia.  We are concerned with finding McMahan 
suffered from paraplegia when neither Dr. Turner nor Dr. Bolt affirmatively 
diagnosed him with this condition, despite McMahan's spinal cord injury and their 
ability to observe his progress post-accident.  Further, we note SCDOE denied 
McMahan's claim for injury to his legs as a result of the accident, instead taking 
the position that McMahan's legs were not affected and not compensable injuries.   
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Given the foregoing, we find it would be illogical to permit SCDOE to deny 
McMahan's injuries to his legs at the outset for treatment purposes but then argue 
his legs were affected for purposes of establishing paraplegia under section 42-9-
10(C) so as to preclude the Estate from receiving his benefits pursuant to section 
42-9-280. Accordingly, we reject SCDOE's argument and find McMahan's award 
does not abate pursuant to section 42-9-10(C). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Appellate Panel's decision is 
REVERSED. 
LOCKEMY, C.J, and MCDONALD, J., concur.
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WILLIAMS, J:  In this civil matter, Allen Patterson and several others1 
(collectively "Appellants") appeal the circuit court's grant of the South Carolina 
Home Builders Self Insurers Fund (the Fund) and its trustees' (collectively 
"Respondents") Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP, motion to dismiss.  Appellants argue the 
court erred in (1) finding the Fund was not a trust; (2) ruling the action involved 
derivative claims subject to the pleading requirements of Rule 23(b)(1), SCRCP; 
and (3) holding Appellants' complaint did not comply with such requirements.  We 
affirm. 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Home Builders Association of South Carolina, Inc. (HBASC) is a nonprofit 
corporation organized under the laws of South Carolina.  HBASC's membership is 
comprised of individual and corporate homebuilders throughout the state.  On 
September 27, 1995, HBASC created the Fund in a document titled "Agreement 
and Declaration of Trust" (the Agreement).  Pursuant to the Agreement with 
1 The other named appellants in this matter are Steve Tilton, Richard Sendler, 
Lincoln Privette, Marc Ellis, Joey Carter, Barry Davis, Michael Nieri, Allen 
Patterson Residential LLC, Tilton Group, Sendler Construction Co., Inc., The 
Barry Davis Company, Inc., Great Southern Homes, and J. Carter, LLC. 
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HBASC, as the "Settlor," the contemporaneously formed "Board of Trustees" (the 
Board) was to direct the affairs of the Fund.  According to the Agreement, the 
Fund's purpose was to meet and fulfill HBASC members' obligations and liabilities 
under the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Act2 (the Act). 
The Fund is regulated and controlled by the South Carolina Workers' 
Compensation Commission (the Commission) and is not an insurance company.  
To become a member of the Fund and satisfy workers' compensation obligations 
under the Act, a homebuilder must first submit an application to the Commission.  
If the Commission approves the application, then the homebuilder receives a 
certificate confirming membership in the Fund.  Five weeks following approval, 
the Fund begins to bill the new member for the premium relating to its business.  
Each Fund member pays a predetermined rate for protection from workers' 
compensation claims of its employees.  Additionally, each member is jointly and 
severally liable for the obligations of the Fund.   
Appellants are members of the Fund.  On February 16, 2012, Appellants filed a 
complaint (First Complaint) against Respondents, bringing causes of action for, 
inter alia, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of trust, and breach of contract. 
Appellants alleged the Board breached its fiduciary duties by voting to remove 
approximately $5 million from the Fund to establish a separate member-owned 
insurance company that Appellants argue would not provide any benefit to existing 
Fund members.3 
After Appellants amended the First Complaint, Respondents moved to dismiss 
under Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP, arguing Appellants failed to meet the pleading 
requirements for derivative suits under Rule 23(b)(1), SCRCP.  Respondents 
alternatively asserted the suit involved the internal affairs of a trust and, thus, was 
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the probate court pursuant to section 62-7-201 
of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2015). 
2 S.C. Code Ann. §§ 42-1-10 through -19-50 (2015 & Supp. 2015). 
3 The $5 million transfer to a new mutual insurance company was ratified by 
96.5% of Fund members and approved by the Commission.  Respondents returned
the $5 million to the Fund after failing to reach an agreement with HBASC on the 
formation of the company.  
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On March 4, 2013, the circuit court accepted Respondents' alternative argument 
and dismissed the action without prejudice, holding it lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction to hear the case. The court ruled Appellants must initially file the 
action in probate court, but could subsequently remove it to circuit court under 
section 62-1-302(d)(4) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2015).
Appellants filed another complaint (Second Complaint) on April 9, 2013, in 
probate court and moved to remove the case to circuit court.  On April 22, 2013, 
the probate court granted Appellants' motion to remove.  In the circuit court, 
Respondents again filed a motion to dismiss the Second Complaint, arguing the 
lawsuit was a shareholder derivative action and Appellants failed to comply with 
the pleading requirements of Rule 23(b)(1).  On November 8, 2013, the circuit 
court denied Respondents' motion to dismiss, holding the Fund was a trust and, as 
such, was not subject to the pleading requirements of Rule 23(b)(1).   
Respondents subsequently filed a Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motion to alter or amend 
judgment. The circuit court granted Respondents' motion on February 11, 2014, 
and dismissed Appellants' Second Complaint.4  In reaching its decision, the court 
found the Fund was not a trust, but instead resembled an unincorporated 
association. The court further explained the "gravamen of the [Appellants'
c]omplaint alleges that the [F]und has been injured, not that the members have 
been injured." Thus, the court found the claims were typical of derivative claims 
subject to the pleading requirements of Rule 23(b)(1), requiring particularized 
allegations that Appellants first made a demand on the Board to obtain the relief 
they sought. The court found Appellants' complaint did not include sufficient 
allegations of such a demand and, therefore, did not comply with Rule 23(b)(1).
The circuit court, however, recognized Respondents had agreed to accept a January 
20, 2013 letter from Appellants as a demand under Rule 23.  After giving 
Respondents sixty days to respond to the letter, the court ruled Appellants "may 
4 Upon our review of the record on appeal, we cannot determine whether the 
Agreement was attached to the Second Complaint.  Nevertheless, given that no 
party raised an issue on appeal regarding the circuit court's review of the 
Agreement under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, we find it is the law of the case.  See 
Trans. Ins. Co. & Flagstar Corp. v. S.C. Second Injury Fund, 389 S.C. 422, 431, 
699 S.E.2d 687, 691 (2010) ("An unappealed ruling is the law of the case and 
requires affirmance.").  
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pursue whatever legal action they determine is appropriate."  On March 3, 2014, 
Appellants filed a motion to alter or amend the order of dismissal, which the circuit 
court denied.  This appeal followed. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. Did the circuit court err in finding the Fund was not a trust? 
II.		 Did the circuit court err in ruling the action involved derivative claims
	
subject to Rule 23(b)(1), SCRCP? 

III.		 Did the circuit court err in holding Appellants' complaint did not comply 
with the pleading requirements of Rule 23(b)(1), SCRCP? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The appellate court applies the same standard of review as the circuit court in 
reviewing the dismissal of an action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP.  Doe v. 
Marion, 373 S.C. 390, 395, 645 S.E.2d 245, 247 (2007).  "A motion to dismiss 
under Rule 12(b)(6) should not be granted if facts alleged and inferences 
reasonably deducible therefrom would entitle the plaintiff to relief on any theory of 
the case." Flateau v. Harrelson, 355 S.C. 197, 202, 584 S.E.2d 413, 415 (Ct. App. 
2003). "The question is whether, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and 
with every doubt resolved in his behalf, the complaint states any valid claim for 
relief." Cole Vision Corp. v. Hobbs, 394 S.C. 144, 149, 714 S.E.2d 537, 539 
(2011). 
LAW/ANALYSIS  
I.		 Unincorporated Association or Trust 
A.		 Judicial Estoppel 
As a preliminary matter, Appellants contend Respondents are judicially estopped 
from arguing the Fund is not a trust because Respondents previously took an 
inconsistent position in their first motion to dismiss Appellants' First Complaint.  
We disagree. 
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 "Judicial estoppel is an equitable concept that prevents a litigant from asserting a 
position inconsistent with, or in conflict with, one the litigant has previously 
asserted in the same or related proceeding."  Cothran v. Brown, 357 S.C. 210, 215, 
592 S.E.2d 629, 631 (2004). "The purpose of the doctrine is to ensure the integrity 
of the judicial process, not to protect the parties from allegedly dishonest conduct 
by their adversary." Id. To prevail on a judicial estoppel claim, a party must prove 
the following:  
 
(1) two inconsistent positions taken by the same party or 
parties in privity with one another; (2) the positions must 
be taken in the same or related proceedings involving the 
same party or parties in privity with each other; (3) the 
party taking the position must have been successful in 
maintaining that position and have received some benefit; 
(4) the inconsistency must be part of an intentional effort 
to mislead the court; and (5) the two positions must be 
totally inconsistent. 
 
Id. at 215–16, 592 S.E.2d at 632.  In South Carolina, the doctrine of judicial 
estoppel applies only to matters of fact, not conclusions of law.  Hayne Fed. Credit 
Union v. Bailey, 327 S.C. 242, 251, 489 S.E.2d 472, 477 (1997).   
 
In its motion to dismiss Appellant's First Complaint, Respondents argued 
Appellants failed to meet the pleading requirements for derivative suits under Rule 
23(b)(1). Respondents alternatively asserted the suit involved the internal affairs 
of a trust and, thus, was under the exclusive jurisdiction of the probate court.  The 
circuit court accepted Respondents' alternative argument when it dismissed the 
case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  After Appellants filed their Second 
Complaint in probate court and removed the case to circuit court, Respondents 
filed another motion to dismiss, contending the Fund was not a trust.  
 
Here, Respondents have not misrepresented facts or changed their version of 
events to gain an advantage in the instant litigation.  See Bailey, 327 S.C. at 252, 
489 S.E.2d at 477 ("When a party has formally asserted a certain version of the 
facts in litigation, he cannot later change those facts when the initial version no 
longer suits him." (emphasis added)).  Rather, Respondents argued alternative legal 
theories concerning the essence of the Fund. See id. at 251, 489 S.E.2d at 477 
(stating the doctrine of judicial estoppel "does not apply to conclusions of law or 
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assertions of legal theories").  Therefore, we find the doctrine of judicial estoppel is 
inapplicable to this case. 
B. Merits
As to the merits of this issue, Appellants argue the circuit court erred in finding the
Fund was not a trust. We disagree. 
"A trust is an 'arrangement whereby property is transferred with intention that it be 
administered by [a] trustee for another's benefit.'" State v. Parris, 363 S.C. 477, 
482, 611 S.E.2d 501, 503 (2005) (quoting State v. Jackson, 338 S.C. 565, 570, 527 
S.E.2d 367, 370 (Ct. App. 2000)). To prove the existence of a trust, one must 
show (1) a declaration creating the trust, (2) a trust res, and (3) designated 
beneficiaries. Whetstone v. Whetstone, 309 S.C. 227, 231, 420 S.E.2d 877, 879 
(Ct. App. 1992). 
"An unincorporated association is a body of individual persons organized without a
charter for the prosecution of some common enterprise."  Graham v. Lloyd's of 
London, 296 S.C. 249, 255, 371 S.E.2d 801, 804 (Ct. App. 1988).  An 
unincorporated association is not a legal entity separate from its members.  Id. 
Moreover, the liability of its members is joint and several.  Elliott v. Greer 
Presbyterian Church, 181 S.C. 84, 96, 186 S.E 651, 658 (1936); see also S.C. 
Code Ann. § 15-35-170 (2005) ("On judgment being obtained against an 
unincorporated association[,] . . . the individual property of any copartner or 
member thereof found in the State shall be liable to judgment and execution for 
satisfaction of any such judgment."). 
We acknowledge that, at first glance, the Agreement contains language that could 
be indicative of the Fund being a trust.  The Agreement refers to HBASC as the 
"Settlor." Further, the Agreement grants the Board all powers conferred by the 
South Carolina Uniform Trustee's Powers Act5 and authorizes it to invest assets of 
the Fund. Cf. S.C. Code Ann. § 62-7-933 (Supp. 2015) (providing the prudent 
investor rule for trustees).  Additionally, the Agreement mentions the Fund's 
5 The South Carolina Uniform Trustee's Powers Act was repealed by the South 
Carolina Uniform Trust Code in 2005.  See Act No. 66, 2005 S.C. Acts 280–518 
(codified as amended at S.C. Code Ann. §§ 62-7-101 through -1106 (Supp. 2015)).  
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compliance with the rule against perpetuities and states the situs of the Fund is the 
State of South Carolina. 
The Agreement, however, also contains provisions usually associated with 
business corporations. The Board, for example, is elected by the Fund's members.  
Cf. S.C. Code Ann. § 33-8-103(d) (2006) (providing for the election of board of 
directors by the shareholders).  In addition, the Agreement provides notice 
requirements for regular and special meetings of the Board.  Cf. S.C. Code Ann. 
§ 33-8-220 (2006) (stating the notice requirements for meetings of the board of 
directors). Likewise, the Agreement requires that the Board establish an office to 
house the Fund's books and records.  Cf. S.C. Code Ann. § 33-16-101 (2006) 
(requiring corporations to maintain a principal office for corporate records).  Under 
the Agreement, the Fund must indemnify the Board for negligence in all actions 
made in good faith. Cf. S.C. Code Ann. § 33-8-510 (2006) (granting authority to 
corporations to indemnify board of directors for actions made in good faith).  
Moreover, the Agreement authorizes the Board to obtain liability insurance at the 
expense of the Fund for all actions, except those made in bad faith or in gross 
negligence. Cf. S.C. Code Ann. § 33-8-570 (2006) (allowing corporations to 
purchase and maintain liability insurance for their board of directors).   
Based upon our review of the Agreement and applicable law, we find the circuit 
court correctly held the Fund was not a trust.  See 1 S. ALAN MEDLIN, ESTATE 
PLANNING IN SOUTH CAROLINA: THE LAW OF WILLS AND TRUSTS § 501.1 (2002) 
(stating "a settlor may fail to create a trust despite using the word trust").  While 
the Agreement—arguably a declaration—most likely satisfies the first element for 
creating a trust, Appellants cannot prove the remaining elements.  See Whetstone, 
309 S.C. at 231, 420 S.E.2d at 879.  First, HBASC did not transfer any money or 
property to the Board to hold in trust for the Fund's members. See S.C. Code Ann. 
§ 62-7-401 (Supp. 2015) (stating a trust may be created by a "transfer of property 
to another person as trustee"); Whetstone, 309 S.C. at 231, 420 S.E.2d at 879 
(holding one must show a trust res to prove the existence of a trust); MEDLIN, 
supra, § 501.1 (noting "[a] settlor cannot create a trust in property not currently 
owned"). After the Fund was created, its members began to contribute 
membership dues and premiums into the Fund in exchange for protection for its 
workers' compensation obligations.
Second, the Agreement contains no provision for "beneficiaries."  See S.C. Code 
Ann. § 62-7-402(a)(3) (Supp. 2015) (requiring a trust to have definite 
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beneficiaries); § 62-7-402(c) ("A beneficiary is definite if the beneficiary can be 
ascertained now or in the future . . . .").  Homebuilders must apply to become Fund 
members.  Further, a third party—the Commission—must approve Fund members.  
Thus, even assuming the Agreement is a declaration of trust, potential Fund 
members are not ascertainable from the Agreement. 
Moreover, we agree with the circuit court that the Fund resembles an 
unincorporated association. See Graham, 296 S.C. at 255, 371 S.E.2d at 804 
(holding an unincorporated association is a "body of individual persons organized 
without a charter for the prosecution of some common enterprise").  The Fund is a 
common enterprise of homebuilders who have voluntarily joined together to form a 
fund to provide workers' compensation coverage for their businesses.  
Additionally, the Fund's members are joint and severally liable for any shortfall in 
Fund assets. See Elliott, 181 S.C. at 96, 186 S.E. at 658 (stating the liability of an 
unincorporated association's members is joint and several).   
Therefore, we find the circuit court properly concluded the Fund was an 
unincorporated association and not a trust.  
II. Direct or Derivative Claims
Appellants next argue their claims are not derivative and, thus, do not need to 
comply with the pleading requirements of Rule 23(b)(1), SCRCP.  We disagree. 
At the outset, because Rule 23(b)(1) covers derivative suits for both corporations 
and unincorporated associations, we find that principles of South Carolina law 
concerning derivative suits for corporations apply in this case.  See Rule 23(b)(1), 
SCRCP (outlining the requirements for "derivative action[s] brought by one or 
more shareholders or members to enforce a right of a corporation or of an 
unincorporated association"). 
"In South Carolina, the authority to direct the business and affairs of a corporation 
is delegated to a board of directors, not the shareholders."  Carolina First Corp. v. 
Whittle, 343 S.C. 176, 185, 539 S.E.2d 402, 407 (Ct. App. 2000).  Individual 
shareholders may not directly sue corporate directors for losses suffered by the 
corporation. Babb v. Rothrock, 303 S.C. 462, 464, 401 S.E.2d 418, 419 (1991). 
"An action seeking to remedy a loss to the corporation is generally a derivative 
one." Brown v. Stewart, 348 S.C. 33, 49, 557 S.E.2d 676, 684 (Ct. App. 2001) 
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(quoting Hite v. Thomas & Howard Co., 305 S.C. 358, 361, 409 S.E.2d 340, 342 
(1991), overruled on other grounds by Huntley v. Young, 319 S.C. 559, 560, 462 
S.E.2d 860, 861 (1995)). 
"A derivative action is, in essence, a challenge to a board's managerial authority."
Whittle, 343 S.C. at 408, 539 S.E.2d at 187.  "[A] shareholder's suit is derivative if 
the gravamen of his complaint is an injury to the corporation and not to the 
individual interest of the shareholder." Brown, 348 S.C. at 49, 557 S.E.2d at 684 
(quoting Hite, 305 S.C. at 361, 409 S.E.2d at 342). 
Nevertheless, the general rule that a shareholder cannot bring a direct suit for 
injuries to a corporation has two exceptions: (1) when the shareholder suffers an 
injury separate and distinct from that suffered by other shareholders, and (2) when 
the alleged wrongdoer owes a fiduciary relationship to the shareholder and full 
relief cannot be accomplished through recovery by the corporation.  Rice-Marko v. 
Wachovia Corp., 398 S.C. 301, 308, 728 S.E.2d 61, 65 (Ct. App. 2012) (quoting
Brown, 348 S.C. at 49, 50, 557 S.E.2d at 684, 685).   
In the instant case, Appellants allege the Board's decision to remove $5 million 
from the Fund harmed the Fund's ability to adequately cover its risks.  Thus, the 
action is premised on the alleged harm to the overall Fund, not to individual 
members.  Accordingly, we find the circuit court correctly held Appellants' claims 
were derivative and subject to the pleading requirements of Rule 23(b)(1).  See 
Rule 23(b)(1), SCRCP (noting the rule applies to members bringing a derivative 
action to enforce a right of an unincorporated association); Brown, 348 S.C. at 49, 
557 S.E.2d at 684 (stating "a shareholder's suit is derivative if the gravamen of his 
complaint is an injury to the corporation and not to the individual interest of the 
shareholder"). 
Appellants also argue their action falls under the fiduciary relationship exception to 
the general rule for derivative suits because the Board owed a special fiduciary 
duty to the Fund's members to protect the Fund's assets.  See Rice-Marko, 398 S.C. 
at 308–09, 728 S.E.2d at 65–66.  The circuit court did not rule on the special duty 
argument, and it is nowhere mentioned by Appellants in their complaints, the 
transcript of the motions hearing, or their Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend 
judgment.  Because Appellants raise this argument for the first time on appeal, we 
find the issue is not preserved for appellate review and decline to address it.  See 
Chastain v. Hiltabidle, 381 S.C. 508, 514–15, 673 S.E.2d 826, 829 (Ct. App. 2009) 
78 

  
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
("[A]n appellate court cannot address an issue unless it was raised to and ruled 
upon by the [circuit] court."). 
Therefore, we find the circuit court properly concluded Appellants' claims were 
derivative and, thus, subject to the requirements of Rule 23(b)(1).  
III. Compliance with Rule 23(b)(1) 
Finally, Appellants assert that, even if their claims are derivative, they properly 
complied with Rule 23(b)(1) by alleging a demand on the Board.  We disagree. 
In pursuing a derivative suit, shareholders must first make a demand on the board 
of directors to take the action they desire or allege that such demand would be 
futile. Whittle, 343 S.C. at 188, 539 S.E.2d at 409 (quoting Allison ex rel. Gen. 
Motors Corp. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 604 F. Supp. 1106, 1112 (D. Del. 1985)).   
The purpose of the demand requirement is to ensure compliance with the most 
fundamental principle of corporate governance: directors are answerable to the 
shareholders and responsible for managing all aspects of corporate affairs.  Id. 
(quoting Gen. Motors Corp., 604 F. Supp. at 1117). "A demand alerts the board so 
that it may take the corrective action, if any, which it deems necessary."  Id.
Rule 23(b)(1) governs the manner in which a shareholder must bring a derivative 
action and provides as follows:
In a derivative action brought by one or more 
shareholders or members to enforce a right of a 
corporation or of an unincorporated association, the 
corporation or association having failed to enforce a right 
which may properly be asserted by it, the complaint shall 
be verified and shall allege that the plaintiff was a 
shareholder or member at the time of the transaction of 
which he complains or that his share or membership 
thereafter devolved on him by operation of law.  The 
complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, 
if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he 
desires from the directors or comparable authority and, if 
necessary, from the shareholders or members, and the 
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reasons for his failure to obtain the action or for not 
making the effort. . . . 
"The demand requirement of Rule 23 balances a shareholder's right to assert a 
derivative claim against a board's duty to decide whether to invest the resources of 
the corporation in pursuit of the shareholder's claim of a corporate wrong."  
Whittle, 343 S.C. at 187, 539 S.E.2d at 408 (quoting Blasband v. Rales, 971 F.2d 
1034, 1048 (3d Cir. 1992)).
The heightened and particularized pleading requirements of Rule 23(b)(1) are 
intended to allow the court to perform a gatekeeping function to prevent the 
unrestrained use of derivative actions.  Id. at 185, 539 S.E.2d at 408 (quoting 5 
JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, ¶ 23.1.02[4] (3d ed. 
2000)). "A derivative action that does not meet the pleading requirements of Rule 
23(b)(1), SCRCP, is properly dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)."  Clearwater 
Tr. v. Bunting, 367 S.C. 340, 351, 626 S.E.2d 334, 339 (2006).
This court has previously upheld the dismissal of a derivative suit when the 
shareholders' complaint failed to comply with Rule 23(b)(1).  See Whittle, 343 S.C. 
at 184–91, 539 S.E.2d 406–10.  In Whittle, a group of shareholders brought a 
derivative suit against a bank's parent corporation, seeking rescission of bonuses 
paid to various bank officers in the form of stock in another company.  343 S.C. at 
181, 539 S.E.2d at 405. The shareholders alleged the bonuses were devised as a 
method of self-dealing to the detriment of the bank and its parent corporation.  Id. 
at 182, 539 S.E.2d at 406. The circuit court granted the bank and other defendants'
motion to dismiss the action, finding the shareholders failed to allege particularized
facts showing they complied with the demand requirements of Rule 23(b)(1) and 
the demand thereafter was wrongfully refused.  Id. at 183, 539 S.E.2d at 406.  
In their complaint, the shareholders only alleged they demanded "certain 
information" and "certain actions" and made a "supplemental demand."  Id. at 189, 
539 S.E.2d at 409. Because the complaint did not contain allegations regarding 
what the shareholders demanded and what the bank's board of directors rejected, 
this court held the shareholders failed to comply with the demand requirements of 
Rule 23(b)(1) and affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of the action.  Id. 
In the instant case, Appellants assert they complied with Rule 23(b)(1), pointing to
paragraph eight of their complaint:
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8. To the extent required by South Carolina Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23, the [Appellants] allege: 
 
a.  The [Appellants] were beneficiaries of the trust 
at all times relevant including when the 
transactions complained of were made. 
 
b.  The [Appellants], their agents or others on their 
behalf have made efforts to obtain the action they 
desire in this matter including correspondence to 
Counsel for the [Respondents], meetings with 
counsel for the [Respondents], correspondence to 
the Trust and a previous lawsuit to no avail. 
ontrary to Appellants' contention, we find they failed to allege sufficient 
articularized facts in their complaint to demonstrate they made a demand on the 
C
p
Board. We first note Appellants' allegations concerning their demand are vague 
and similar to those made in Whittle. 343 S.C. at 189, 539 S.E.2d at 406 (noting 
the shareholders only alleged in their complaint that they demanded "certain 
information" and "certain actions" and made a "supplemental demand").  In 
paragraph 41 of their complaint, Appellants requested that the circuit court (1) 
remove the entire Board for their breach of fiduciary duties, (2) provide for the 
election of a new Board, (3) order that all assets be returned to the Fund, (3) order 
all damages incurred and money taken from the Fund be awarded, (4) enjoin future
violations of fiduciary duties, and (5) award Appellants actual and punitive 
damages.  
In paragraph eight of the complaint, however, Appellants provided no guidance on 
exactly what recourse they sought from the Board prior to this suit.  Therefore, the 
circuit court could not discern whether Appellants simply requested the $5 million 
be returned to the Fund or whether they, among other things, demanded that 
members of the Board resign or called for a new election.  As a result, the circuit 
court was not in a position to determine whether the Board's refusal of the demand 
was wrongful and decide whether to allow the lawsuit to proceed.  See Whittle, 343 
S.C. at 189, 539 S.E.2d at 409 (holding shareholders did not comply with Rule 
23(b)(1) because their complaint did not contain allegations regarding what they 
demanded and what the board of directors rejected).   
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Appellants nevertheless counter that their January 20, 2013 letter—a proper 
demand on the Board—was incorporated by reference in their Second Complaint.6 
We find Appellants did not specifically incorporate the letter by reference in 
merely stating they sent "correspondence" to Respondents.  Moreover, Appellants 
conceded the letter was not attached to the complaint, but rather was only included 
with their memorandum in opposition to Respondents' motion to dismiss.  See Rule 
10(c), SCRCP ("A copy of any plat, photograph, diagram, document, or other 
paper which is an exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof for all purposes if a copy is 
attached to such pleading."); McCormick v. England, 328 S.C. 627, 632–33, 494 
S.E.2d 431, 433 (Ct. App. 1997) ("A ruling on a motion to dismiss a claim must be 
based solely on the allegations set forth on the face of the complaint.").   
Therefore, we find the circuit court properly concluded that Appellants failed to 
comply with the requirements of Rule 23(b)(1). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, we hold the circuit court properly concluded the Fund was 
not a trust, Appellants' claims were derivative, and Appellants failed to comply 
with the pleading requirements of Rule 23(b)(1).  Accordingly, the circuit court's 
grant of Respondents' motion to dismiss is  
6 After Respondents alerted Appellants to the Rule 23(b)(1) requirements by 
moving to dismiss the First Complaint for failure to comply with the rule, 
Appellants sent the January 20, 2013 demand letter.  Respondents replied, stating 
they were withholding a substantive response until the circuit court ruled on their 
motion to dismiss.  The circuit court dismissed the First Complaint for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction on March 5, 2013.  Respondents contend that, before 
they were able to provide a substantive reply, Appellants filed the Second
Complaint in probate court on April 9, 2013, and removed the matter to circuit 
court. The circuit court then dismissed the Second Complaint and gave 
Respondents sixty days to respond to the demand letter, allowing Appellants to file 
another complaint that complied with Rule 23(b)(1).  Appellants, however, instead 
chose to appeal the circuit court's dismissal.  
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AFFIRMED.7
	
HUFF and THOMAS, JJ., concur.  

7 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.  
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